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ABSTRACT 
Space and cyber operations have changed national security for both nations and non-state 
actors worldwide.  The low barriers to entry have allowed less sophisticated nations and 
actors to have an impact on the U.S. and near-peer nations.  The lack of attribution and 
the ability to obfuscate the source of the space or cyber weapon will make the case for 
wartime retaliation difficult.  The highly proactive antisatellite weapons test conducted by 
China in 2007 and the alleged employment of Stuxnet against Iran's nuclear program by 
the United States and Israel illustrates the potentially destabilizing effects to high priority 
national programs.  If a hostile country were to remove the technological advantage, 
especially concerning space platforms, it could neutralize the conventional weapons 
advantage of the United States in future conflicts.  This thesis will explore the key 
components of both the space and cyberspace domains.  The threat of weapons 
employment, the unique deterrence characteristics of the space and cyberspace domains, 
and some case studies where these weapons have been employed.  Ultimately, this paper 
investigates under what conditions deterrence is possible with regard to space and 
cyberspace technologies.  In addition, answers the key question, of whether future 
enemies can be deterred from attacking U.S. space systems.       
 
 
KEYWORDS:  space, cyberspace, deterrence, space control, effects based operations 
 
 This abstract is approved as to form and content 
 
   
 _______________________________ 
 John P. Rose, PhD, Brig Gen (U.S. Army Ret.)
 Chairperson, Advisory Committee 
 Missouri State University 
iv 
CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING DEFENSE POLICIES TO DETER 
HOSTILE ACTORS IN SPACE AND CYBERSPACE 
 
By 
Stephan D. B. Powers 
 
A Masters Thesis 
Submitted to the Graduate College 
Of Missouri State University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies 
 
 
May 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Approved: 
 
 
   
  _______________________________________ 
  John P. Rose, PhD 
 
   
  _______________________________________ 
  Dana Johnson, PhD 
  
   
  _______________________________________ 
  Andrei Shoumikhin, PhD 
 
 
  _______________________________________ 
  Julie Masterson, PhD: Dean, Graduate College 
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
I would like to thank all the people that supported not only my career, but also my 
education.  Without the support of family, friends, professors, and colleagues, I am not 
sure if I would have been able to accomplish what I have today.   
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 
 
Chapter One – Defining the Domain ...................................................................................3 
 Space Defined ..........................................................................................................3 
 Space Operational Considerations .........................................................................12 
 Cyberspace Defined ...............................................................................................18 
 
Chapter Two – Defining the Threat ...................................................................................25 
 
Chapter Three – Unique Deterrence Characteristics of Space and Cyberspace ................42 
 Counterspace Weapons Technology ......................................................................43 
 Space Stability .......................................................................................................51 
 Cyberspace Weapons Technology .........................................................................59 
 Cyber Deterrence Observations .............................................................................63 
 
Chapter Four – Case Studies ..............................................................................................70 
 2007 China ASAT Test ..........................................................................................70 
 Stuxnet Employment in Iran ..................................................................................73 
 Russia’s Cyber Attack of Georgia .........................................................................76 
 Chinese Hack of OPM ...........................................................................................80 
 
Chapter Five – Conclusion.................................................................................................84 
 
References ..........................................................................................................................88 
 
 
 
  
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Types of Operational Orbits .................................................................................8 
Figure 2. Molniya Orbit .....................................................................................................11 
Figure 3. Number of Objects in Earth Orbit by Type ........................................................17 
Figure 4. The Three Layers of Cyberspace ........................................................................21 
Figure 5. Dong Feng-21 Road-Mobile IRBM ...................................................................71 
Figure 6. FENGYUN-1C Debris Track Post Engagement ................................................71 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is difficult to deter nations, rogue states, and non-state actors from employing 
offensive counterspace and/or cyberspace technologies against the United States.  
Currently China and Russia either have developed, or are developing robust offensive 
capabilities to operate against U.S. interests in space and cyberspace.  To counter this 
growing threat, the U.S. is pursuing additional capabilities to increase the resiliency of 
space systems to provide a level of defense against these developing counterspace 
technologies.  In the case of radio frequency satellite communications jammers and cyber 
weapons, the technological cost of employing these systems is small enough that regional 
powers and non-state actors can be effective against more advanced nations like the 
United States.  A fundamental shift in thinking is required to deter nations and other 
actors from employing offensive space and cyberspace against U.S. interests.  
Essentially, this should lead to a policy that includes a mechanism that ensures the cost of 
employing technologies against the U.S. that would outweigh the perceived benefits of 
their use.  
The very nature of today’s modern technology, which allows for instantaneous 
communications and global effective commerce, is also a weakness.  This technology is 
often taken for granted by its users, and there are limited safeguards in these systems to 
prevent offensive effects employed by a hostile actor.  If a hostile actor were to degrade 
the precise timing provided by navigation satellites, the effects could be devastating to 
not only commerce but also many other critical facets of everyday life.  The need to 
determine the difference between what is a nuisance intrusion or a sophisticated attack 
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will require a concerted effort by the U.S. government in order to solve.  The complexity 
of the employed weapon, and the method of employment, affect the ability to detect and 
attribute the hostile actions.  Additionally, these technologies can be used to permanently 
damage and destroy infrastructure.  With space, the technologies begin with radio 
frequency (RF) jamming for reversible interference and continue to directed energy and 
kinetic kills vehicles with potentially permanent and irreversible effects, whereas cyber-
attacks can range from theft of information of organizations’ personnel or intellectual 
property to the sabotage of national infrastructure.  This information can be used to 
bolster development of weapons that can be acquired much faster and without expending 
the vast amounts of capital for advance technologies.  Additionally, the cyber threat can 
be used to derail a national program.  An example of this was seen in Iran when Stuxnet 
was discovered in their uranium processing facilities.  Few would argue against the fact 
that the advent of space and cyberspace technologies is having a profound impact in the 
realm of national security.  Both technologies represent new opportunities for warfare 
outside of the traditional land, sea, and air domains for traditional military power.  If any 
nation were to remove the remarkable advantages provided by both space and cyberspace 
technologies, it would imperil the conventional weapons dominance observed in both 
current and future conflicts.  This paper will investigate the challenges seen in crafting 
and applying deterrence principles with regard to space and cyberspace technologies, and 
the potential course of action to remedy this situation. 
  
 3 
CHAPTER ONE – DEFINING THE DOMAIN 
 
Space Defined 
In order to examine the issue of deterrence application within the space domain, it 
is important to define the characteristics unique to space.  There are varying definitions 
on where space begins, but the Karman line commonly represents the boundary between 
the Earth’s atmosphere and outer space.  This occurs at 100 kilometers (or sixty-two 
miles) above sea level.1  This use of a simple line does streamline the discussion, but it 
does not constrain the discussion to matters practical to space operations.  Building on 
this concept, Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, provides a thorough explanation 
on space as a domain, and the characteristics unique to space.  Unlike the domains of 
land, sea, and air, the space environment’s unique characteristics affect not only military 
operations but also daily commerce.  This requires policy makers to have to have a 
fundamental understanding of the strengths and vulnerabilities of space capabilities.  
However, with more countries seeing the benefits that space brings to government and 
commerce, space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.  While 
space is vast, there are only limited orbital regimes suitable for use.  Furthermore, when 
coupling the limited orbital regimes with the finite amount of radio frequency (RF) 
spectrum, requires effective deconfliction for space operations.  As more nations and 
organizations realize the benefits of space this will continue to increase the number of 
                                                 
1 Dr. S. Sanz Fernández de Córdoba, “100km Altitude Boundary for Astronautics,” Fédération 
Aéronautique Internationale (FAI), accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.fai.org/icare-records/100km-
altitude-boundary-for-astronautics. 
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satellites, and the resulting threat of space debris during a conflict will reach a tipping 
point potentially threating the ability to launch and operate future space missions.   
Space is currently a force enabler to all other military operations, making it 
unique and different from the terrestrial domains.  Integrated military command and 
control seen today is a direct result of the strengths of space technology enabling near 
real-time communication from the national command structure to deployed units 
worldwide.  This unparalleled technology has gone through great lengths to shrink the 
world and provide voluminous data to any country willing to commit the resources to 
field a robust capability.  Space provides not only a global perspective leading some to 
comment that space is the “ultimate high ground.”  At a high level, this perspective 
leverages the ability for satellites in low earth orbit to travel at great speeds to observe 
any point on the earth over the course of a day, or for satellites in geosynchronous orbits 
to maintain a persistent overwatch of a third of the Earth.  Satellites traverse or watch 
large areas of Earth by the very nature of how they orbit, and they maintain an additional 
benefit of not being hindered by international laws for overflight of sovereign nations 
since space has no geographical borders.  This creates an advantage and allows for 
unrestricted access to denied areas spanning the globe.  This capability enables numerous 
mission areas such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 
communications, navigation, and weather monitoring.2 
To further understand the benefits of satellite overflight, it is necessary to discuss 
some fundamental laws of physics that govern space operations discovered by Sir Isaac 
Newton and Johannes Kepler.  The laws, Newton’s laws of motion and Kepler’s laws of 
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations,” May 2013, G1-2, accessed 
December 15, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. 
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planetary motion, define how orbital motion occurs around a celestial body.3  Physics 
truly makes space different from the traditional laws seen with land, sea, and air.  For the 
most part, the laws are well understood and the changes are observable to those without 
specialized training and education.  Space differs from this since it demands some level 
of understanding of orbital mechanics.  This chapter will explain the fundamentals 
required to discuss the space domain effectively, but it will not delve deeply into the 
subject based on the highly technical nature of the math involved.  However, it is 
important to build a foundational language to adequately describe the orbits, capabilities, 
and limitations of the satellites in use today.     
The primary force driving and defining operations in space is gravity.  In Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO), the Earth’s gravitational field causes satellites to constantly fall 
towards Earth’s center.  This falling is counteracted by the extreme speeds that a 
spacecraft operates at.  From a simplistic point of view, Earth’s surface curves downward 
at a rate of five meters for every eight kilometers horizontally.  This requires that LEO 
satellites cover this same area to remain in orbit, and this requires the satellite to travel at 
least seven point eight kilometers per second (17,500 miles per hour).  As the orbits move 
away from basic low earth, the speeds for orbital insertion vary based on the altitude and 
shape of the targeted orbit.  The orbital period is defined as the amount of time that a 
satellite takes to complete one full revolution around the occupied foci of the orbit.  From 
a practical standpoint, orbits are fixed in space.  However, they can be manipulated by 
external forces such as orbital perturbations or to a limited degree from onboard control 
systems.  While the orbit is essentially fixed in space, the Earth rotates beneath the orbit 
                                                 
3 Jerry Sellers, Understanding Space, An Introduction to Astronautics, Third Edition. (McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc., 2007), 38, 111–116. 
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while the orbits ground track will trace over the Earth over a variable period of time.  The 
large amounts of angular momentum result in a large amounts of inertia to overcome.  
This inertia leads to a large amount of resistance to making changes to the orbital plane.  
Contrary to the common misconception about satellites being easy to reposition and 
maneuver, the very nature of the forces applied to satellites results in limited freedom of 
maneuver based on restricted onboard resources.4 
As mentioned earlier, satellites are not very maneuverable based on the high 
amount of angular momentum that has to be countered to effect any real orbital change.  
Additionally, maneuvering a satellite for the purpose of changing an orbits size (altitude) 
or inclination costs fuel and limits the life of the satellite.  Based on these limitations it is 
not possible for satellites to “hover” over a particular point on Earth, nor can they “bend” 
their planes to a specified point on the planet.  A satellite’s access to a point on Earth is 
dependent on time, i.e., time for the Earth to rotate under the satellite’s orbit.  This orbit 
rotation is based on the underlying assumption that a satellite’s orbital plane must pass 
through the Earth’s center.  In addition to the onboard maneuver capability, perturbations 
will affect an orbit.  More specifically, perturbations will alter an orbit depending on the 
amount of a particular force imparted.  For example, atmospheric drag and solar radiation 
pressure can cause an orbit to decay and force the satellite operators to expend resources 
to maintain the orbit.  The gravitational pull of the sun, moon, and other planets can alter 
certain types of orbits.  These orbital perturbations complicate the orbital propagation and 
mission planning of satellites.  This requires space-faring nations to have the ability to 
track objects and orbit and develop models.  This tracking is not only essential to the 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations,” G1-2. 
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operational considerations of space operations, but is important for space situational 
awareness functions that will be described later.5 
Describing the various orbit regimes is essential to the overall exploration into 
space issues.  Just as satellites have limited maneuverability, there are specific orbits that 
utilize unique characteristics for national security and civil missions.  Figure 1, shown 
below, illustrates the various orbit regimes that will be described in more detail 
throughout this chapter.  This illustration details the various orbits and a general set of 
characteristics for each example.  Specifically, the illustration contains data on orbit 
altitude, orbital velocity, orbital period, and an example mission that would utilize that 
orbit.  The four orbits described in this illustration, while not all-inclusive, represent the 
major operational orbits in use for most satellites.  As each of the orbits will be described 
in further detail, Figure 1 will be referenced to show the general orbital parameters.    
As mentioned earlier, satellites cannot “hover” over a particular spot on the Earth, 
but that is essentially what geosynchronous and geostationary (GEO) satellites do.  The 
orbital altitude of GEO satellites means they orbit around the Earth at the same rate or 
rotation as Earth around its axis.  These satellites have an orbital period of nearly twenty-
four hours, during which the satellite will move one degree along its orbit path shown in 
Figure 1.  The reason these satellites appear to hover is that they are placed at an altitude 
of 42,164 kilometers from the center of the Earth’s.  The main benefit of GEO orbit is the 
ability to cover a third of the orbit with one satellite.  This benefit allows for a large field 
of view (FOV), but this is at the cost of the potential resolution of the onboard sensors to 
discern small objects.  The main difference between a geosynchronous and geostationary 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
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orbit is the geostationary orbit will have an orbit with zero inclination and eccentricity.  
This will keep the satellite at a fixed point on the equator over the Earth.  This contrasts 
with the ground trace of a geosynchronous orbit which will trace out a figure eight when 
observed from the ground.6 
 
Figure 1.  Types of Operational Orbits.7 
 
 
                                                 
6 Holli Riebeek, “Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits: Three Classes of Orbit,” NASA Earth Observatory, last 
modified September 4, 2009, accessed April 10, 2016, 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/OrbitsCatalog/page2.php. 
7 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations,” G4. 
 
 
 
 
Orbit Types 
Highly Elliptical Orbit 
Molniya 
Altitude: 
~ 400 km at perigee 
~ 40,000 km at apogee 
Speed: 
~ 10.13 km/s at perigee 
Period: 11 hours, 58 minutes 
Geosynchronous Orbit 
DSP 
Altitude: 
35,786 km 
Speed: 
3.075 km/s 
Period: 23 hours, 
56 minutes 
Semi-Synchronous Orbit 
GPS 
Altitude: 20,184 km 
Speed: 3.8746 km/s 
Period: 11 hours, 58 minutes 
Low Earth Orbit 
DMSP 
Altitude: ~ 850 km 
Speed: ~ 7.426 km/s 
Period: 101 minutes 
Legend 
DMSP 
DSP 
GPS 
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
Defense Support Program 
Global Positioning System 
km kilometers 
kilometers per second 
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Where GEO orbits have the ability to monitor large swaths of the Earth at lower 
resolution, Low Earth Orbits (LEO) will sweep over the Earth at high rates of speed with 
sophisticated sensors capable of high-resolution data collection.  An example of this is 
seen in Figure 1 where it describes the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
(DMSP).  While there is no formalized definition of what comprises a LEO orbit, these 
orbits usually will not measure more than 1,000 kilometers from the farthest point of its 
orbit (apogee) to the center of the earth.  The relative speeds that are observed in LEO 
approach seven kilometers a second (roughly 24,600 kilometers an hour) with an orbital 
period of approximately 100 minutes.  Additionally, the amount of atmospheric density 
has a dramatic impact to the operational life of the satellite.  Missions in LEO can be 
maintained as long as there are no hardware failures, and as long as there is sufficient 
propellant to continue operations.  Propellant is typically the single largest life-limiting 
item of a LEO satellite.  The LEO regime is unique in space operations as the only area 
where both manned objects, like the International Space Station, and unmanned satellites 
coexist.  However, this is typically lower than 500 kilometers to reduce the need for 
radiation shielding from the Van Allen radiation belt.8   
The Van Allen radiation belt exists between layers of the Earth’s magnetosphere.  
This belt is comprised of trapped concentrated charged particles that have escaped those 
outer layers.  This radiation is a concern in satellite design, as well as manned spaceflight 
missions.9  These low-earth satellites have the benefit of leveraging lower power 
transmitters and sensors, but this comes at the cost of reduced time over a target of 
interest or satellite ground station (access time).  This feature necessitates the need to 
                                                 
8 Ibid., G6. 
9 Sellers, Understanding Space, An Introduction to Astronautics, 87–90. 
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maintain constellations of multiple satellites that are spaced (commonly referred to as 
orbit phasing) around the orbit to maintain optimum or continuous coverage. 
While satellites in both LEO and GEO orbits are the ones that commonly come to 
mind, there are a couple of other orbits that are germane to the discussion in this paper.  
Specifically, the Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) are used 
for various purposes for either northern latitude coverage or positioning, navigation, and 
timing (PNT) which is better known as the Global Positioning System (GPS).  MEO, like 
other orbits, do not have a formal definition.  MEO orbits are near circular, and are also 
referred to as semi-synchronous and will have an orbital altitude around 20,200 
kilometers.10   However, they will orbit the Earth twice daily with a twelve-hour period 
and when used with GPS will have an orbital inclination of fifty-five degrees.11   Both of 
these orbit types are shown earlier in Figure 1 for reference when compared with both 
LEO and GEO orbits. 
HEO orbits, as the name implies, are a highly elliptical orbit.  This varies from the 
orbits discussed earlier, which are primarily near circular and are described in Figure 1.  
What makes HEO orbits unique is the difference in apogee and perigee orbit will be quite 
vast.  At HEO orbit’s most distant point, the orbit stretch to greater than 40,000 
kilometers.  The time it takes for the HEO orbit to pass through its furthest point gives 
these orbits a significant hang time over the poles and can appear to “hover” for a period 
of time.  While there are numerous types of HEO orbits, the most well-known is the 
Molniya orbit.  The word Molniya is Russian for “lightning.”  The Molniya orbit is 
inclined at 63.4 degrees, and this will provide for extended communications and ISR 
                                                 
10 Riebeek, “Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits.” 
11 Sellers, Understanding Space, An Introduction to Astronautics, 164. 
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coverage over high latitude.  An example of a Molniya orbit can be seen in Figure 2.   
Satellites in these orbits are used for providing communications and servicing areas that 
include Russia, the Nordic countries, and Canada.  The specific inclination is used to 
minimize the propellant expenditure to maintain the Molniya orbit based on the fact that 
the orbit’s perigee will not rotate around the Earth.  This allows the orbit’s perigee to be 
maintained in the Southern hemisphere, and ensures the maximum dwell of eleven of the 
twelve hours in the Northern hemisphere shown in the figure below.12 
 
 
Figure 2.  Molniya Orbit.13 
  
                                                 
12 Ibid., 276. 
13 Riebeek, “Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits.” 
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Space Operational Considerations 
A secondary consideration for any domain is the specific operational planning 
considerations to employ the technology effectively.  A concern to both policy and 
decision makers is that no asset is ever in the right place at the right time to answer a 
critical question.  Whereas most people, including policy makers, have enough 
familiarization with sensors hosted on either aircraft or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) 
to expect that a near immediate re-tasking is often available for a new high interest event.  
Unlike airborne systems that retain the capability to maintain a near persistent overwatch 
of an area of interest, the nature of orbital mechanics necessitates some level of 
familiarization with how satellites move through space for an individual to understand 
that a satellite cannot simply reorient or reposition to answer an immediate question. 
That leads to the important consideration of satellite revisit rates.  These revisit 
rates refer to the period elapsed between orbits of a given satellite over the same point on 
the Earth.  These rates are highly dependent on the orbit’s geometry and orbital period.  
Typically, the higher an orbit’s altitude, the longer it will take a satellite to revisit that 
point target.  The rotation of the Earth factors into this revisit time as it continues to 
rotate, and the successive satellite pass will be east of the previous ground track.  As 
noted earlier, the altitude is a major component of revisit rate.  LEO satellites will 
maintain revisit rates ranging from ninety minutes to a few hours.  Alternatively, you can 
contrast this with GEO satellites that do not have a true revisit rate.  GEO satellites will 
constantly maintain line of sight (LOS) with the geographic areas under their FOV.14  
Once you understand the revisit rate, the satellite ground track can be modeled to aid in 
                                                 
14 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations,” G7. 
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planning of other portions of the satellite’s orbit.  The ground track shows the satellite’s 
position with regard to a predicted tack on the Earth.  This is easier for most people to 
visualize instead of the classical orbital elements used in most satellite operations. 15  
Either the propagated orbit or the derived ground track will be used to calculate and 
display satellite access windows.  These windows in time are when a given satellite will 
be able to maintain LOS with a point of interest on the ground.  This can be the satellite’s 
ground station for receiving command and tasking to that of ground targets for the 
onboard sensors to capture.  The lower a satellites orbit, the smaller the sensor FOV will 
be.  Typically, a LEO satellite will have access with a particular point on the ground for 
around ten to fifteen minutes.  For better or worse, a satellite’s orbit is defined by physics 
and can be predicted.  This is an important factor to note for both planning of day-to-day 
operations as well as offensive and defensive missions.  It is not uncommon for 
operations to be planned around other nations ISR satellites’ access times to maintain 
some level of deception for ongoing operations.  The same can be said of other nations 
with competing interests with the United States.16    
The next consideration is important for multiple reasons that will be described 
later in the paper with regard to the specific application of counterspace platforms.  From 
the standpoint of data, the most important factor is how current the information is on a 
given satellite.  This factor influences every facet of satellite operations, from tracking of 
all objects in space to the propagation of the data to support tasking for sensor use.  As 
noted earlier, the altitude is one of the largest factors determining the length of the 
accuracy of a given set of satellite tracks.  The lower a satellites altitude, the shorter the 
                                                 
15 Sellers, Understanding Space, An Introduction to Astronautics, 179–184. 
16 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations,” G7. 
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period that the data will be within tolerances.  Additionally, orbital perturbations 
mentioned earlier in the chapter will continue to degrade orbital predictions.  In addition 
to data accuracy, there is the presence of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radio 
Frequency Interference (RFI).  The limiting factor with space derives from the fact that 
the very use of satellite requires some level of Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EMS) and 
without Radio Frequency (RF), these capabilities enable ISR, communications, and 
navigation missions.  Space-based assets use RF as their only means of transmitting and 
receiving data, and once the frequency bands have been built into a satellite they cannot 
be changed after launch.  Consequently, every space mission is subject to some level of 
EMI, naturally occurring or man-made, and there is often some level of satellite design to 
mitigate the impacts of the phenomenon.  Natural EMI is generated by the Earth’s 
ionosphere, a region of the atmosphere comprised of ionized gases that create noise in the 
EMS, and is typically not uniform.  Additionally, the sun generates electromagnetic 
energy and that also will react with the Earth’s magnetic fields that will strengthen or 
weaken based on various environmental factors that can be observed both locally and 
globally.  Generally, the environmental EMI can be predicted and mitigated through 
power management and reducing operations during peak EMI periods.  Man-made EMI, 
or in this case RFI, is usually attributed to another user broadcasting on the same 
frequency and this is analogous to friendly jamming.  However, RFI can be a result of 
hostile jamming with the intent of degrading the satellite or services that it provides to the 
end user.  This topic will be explored more deeply in subsequent chapters.17   
                                                 
17 Ibid., G7-8. 
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A separate set of operational environmental concerns deal with some uniquely 
challenging factors for space – space weather and space debris.  Earlier in the chapter, 
there was some basic description of the Van Allen radiations belts, and satellites 
operating in those environments can encounter additional radiation.  This is further 
complicated by space weather, which is primarily generated by the sun.  Space weather 
often manifests itself with charged particles, ionospheric interference, like scintillation, 
solar flares, and cosmic rays.  These weather phenomena will have varied effects 
depending on the particular satellite design and payload.  These impacts can range from 
minor RF degradation to potential onboard electronics failure.18   
If the complexities of space were not already enough, there is the constant threat 
of orbital debris.  Unfortunately, there is not a mechanism to remove old or defunct space 
objects from orbit.  The complexity and cost of this has so far kept this capability out of 
reach of the industrial world.  An additional consideration on the technology required to 
remove orbital debris is the very same technology that would be employed for 
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) that would facilitate co-orbital anti-satellite 
weapons.  This debris can be left from rocket bodies used to place satellites on orbit, on 
orbit explosions, collisions, or micrometeorites.  An additional threat of debris is 
compounded by the extremely small nature of some debris and the inability of systems to 
track it.  As debris occurs, it tends to initially remain in the same orbit as the object it was 
generated from until some level of force changes that orbit.  This leads to the long term 
process debris dispersal, where debris make take weeks or months, to separate from the 
source in an operational orbit.   
                                                 
18 Sellers, Understanding Space, An Introduction to Astronautics, 73–89. 
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Furthermore, the altitude of the debris influences the amount of time it can be a 
threat.  If an object were to break up at a higher altitude, it could take hundreds of years 
before gravity pulls that object into the atmosphere to where it will burn in.  Recent 
orbital events have left debris clouds in orbits that have taken years to fall into lower 
portions of space leading to numerous collision avoidance activities by space system 
owners and operators.  In some cases, debris events can lead to collisional cascading of 
debris that ultimately can destroy other objects in space.  Since 2007, this problem has 
taken on a new sense of urgency with the Chinese anti-satellite test, and the collision of 
the Cosmos and Iridium satellites in 2009.  At the time of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) Joint Publication on Space Operations, there were approximately 800 active 
satellites in the satellite catalog (SATCAT).  Additionally, the United States Air Force 
(USAF) tracks more than 21,000 other objects larger than ten centimeters.  However, 
there are over 300,000 items of untracked debris between one and ten centimeters in size 
that remain a threat to space operations now and well into the future that could lead to a 
runaway chain of events that leads something known as the Kessler Syndrome, where 
collision after collision leads to an operational orbit being unusable for centuries.   
Figure 3 illustrates the growing trend of objects in space since the initial launch of 
Sputnik.  Additionally, this figure shows the marked increase in orbital objects through 
2013.  Although this illustration only runs through 2013, is shows the major increase in 
total objects in space to include two of the more notable incidents of the Chinese anti-
satellite weapons test and the collision of an Iridium communications satellite with a 
defunct Russian communications satellite.  Those two incidents alone accounted for an 
increase of greater than seventy-five percent of orbital debris.  If nations were to engage 
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in full-scale anti-satellite warfare, the increased debris trends seen from 2007-2009 would 
pale in comparison.  This ultimately could make low earth orbit unusable for years and 
imperil any and all nations future space missions.    
 
 
Figure 3.  Number of Objects in Earth Orbit by Type.19         
 
As with all platforms, one satellite is never enough, and there is no satellite in 
existence that can support every application.  Although there are some constellations of 
satellites, like GPS, which are comprised of multiple satellites that are designed in similar 
blocks, most satellites are custom built for a given application.  In the case of GPS, the 
constellation requires a robust constellation to ensure that a user anywhere on Earth with 
a GPS receiver can track a minimum of four satellites to get an accurate three-
dimensional fix on their position.  Additionally, ISR constellations will likely be 
optimized over several altitudes and inclinations to provide the right mix of access times 
                                                 
19 Mika McKinnon, “A History of Garbage in Space,” Earth & Space, accessed January 17, 2016, 
http://space.gizmodo.com/a-history-of-garbage-in-space-1572783046. 
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and revisit rates to meet the needs of the satellite operators.  In addition to the limits on 
the number of satellites, the final unique consideration for space is the lack of on-orbit 
serviceability.  Satellites are one of the few technologies that you have to ensure they are 
as close to perfect as possible prior to launch.  Because once the satellite is in space, there 
is virtually no way to fix any hardware issues.  A satellite can be designed for robust 
operations with multiple components and strings of equipment to swap as failures occur, 
but you cannot replace a bad component with a spare.  In some cases, the software can be 
updated from the ground in a time-consuming and somewhat risky process.  This results 
in limited capabilities when compared to typical terrestrial systems.  This lack of 
serviceability results in tighter constraints being maintained on all satellites, and the 
mission area requires that each resource by carefully managed to ensure a full and useful 
design life.20         
 
Cyberspace Defined 
Like the space domain, cyberspace exists in multiple territories and jurisdictions 
and that distributed environment leads to complexities for policy makers.  Although 
space is a very important aspect of day-to-day life, there are aspects of life that do not 
rely on space technology.  However, the same is not true with regard to cyberspace 
technologies.  Nearly every facet of everyday life has some component that is reliant on 
cyberspace.  The technology utilized in the cyber domain is vast and often taken for 
granted.  Furthermore, some very specific factors have wide-ranging impacts on national 
security.  Joint Publication 3-12R, Cyberspace Operations, defines the cyberspace 
                                                 
20 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations,” G6-8. 
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domain as, “the global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology (IT) infrastructures and resident data, 
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers.”21  From a policy standpoint, cyberspace is problematic as it 
reaches across both geographic and geopolitical borders.  Additionally, most of 
cyberspace is outside of U.S. control and is integrated into critical infrastructure.  
Cyberspace is also critical to the daily conducting of commerce, governance, and national 
security.  Conversely, the same access to the Internet provides adversaries of the U.S. the 
ability to compromise the integrity of critical infrastructure and conduct vast cyber 
espionage campaigns with large impacts of future technologies.  This leads to what the 
authors of Joint Publication 3-12R call the paradox within cyberspace, “the prosperity 
and security of our nation have been significantly enhanced by our use of cyberspace, yet 
these same developments have led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence 
on cyberspace.”22 
To be more specific, cyberspace is a global domain that relies on an 
interdependent network of information technology (IT) infrastructure.  This infrastructure 
includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, processors, and 
controllers to manage the data flowing across these networks.  Cyberspace Operations 
(CO) rely on these links and nodes that reside in the physical domains to perform 
functions in both the physical and cyberspace domains.  Cyberspace Operations enable 
freedom of action for activities in the other domains while utilizing the EMS and physical 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-12(R) Cyberspace Operations,” n.d., I1, accessed 
December 16, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf. 
22 Ibid. 
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infrastructure that each of the other four domains maintains for operational support.  
Additionally, the relationship between space and cyberspace is very close and space 
operations are not possible without the infrastructure provided by networks.  To the same 
degree worldwide cyber operations are not possible without the global reach of space 
technology.  Cyberspace is made up of many different and overlapping networks and 
nodes.  These nodes, are devices or logical locations that support an internet protocol (IP) 
address or identifier.  These nodes use routing tables to navigate the layers of cyberspace 
that will be described in more detail in the next few paragraphs.  It is important to note 
that not all networks are connected or accessible from any other network.  From a design 
standpoint, many networks are supposed to be isolated to prevent any cross talk and to 
afford some level of security from outside threats.  Networks will utilize access controls, 
encryption, and physical separation to maintain security and data integrity.23 
Cyberspace Operations can be described as occurring in the terms of three layers 
and those are the physical network, the logical network, and the cyber-persona shown in 
Figure 4.  The first of these layers is the physical network layer.  This layer, shown in the 
leftmost illustration of Figure 4, is comprised of the geographic component and the 
physical network hardware where all the data travel.  The geographic component is 
located in the land, air, sea, or space domains where the data are transmitted near the 
speed of light.  This portion of the layer is where the sovereignty issuers are tied to those 
physical domains.  Whereas the physical network component consists of all the hardware, 
software, and infrastructure (to include the potential RF links) that supports the network 
and physical connections.  The hardware also utilizes logical constructs as the primary 
                                                 
23 Ibid., I1-2. 
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method of securing the network.  This portion is the primary target for signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), computer network exploitation (CNE), measurement and 
signature intelligence (MASINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and human 
intelligence (HUMINT).  This is the first point of reference for jurisdiction with 
applicable authorities.  Additionally, this layer is the layer that can be exploited by 
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) which contributes targeting data for cyberspace 
operations.24   
 
 
Figure 4.  The Three Layers of Cyberspace.25 
 
Seen in the second illustration contained in Figure 4, the next layer is described as 
the logical network layer.  This layer consists of the elements of the network that are 
related to the infrastructure on the physical network layer.  This layer is rather abstract 
when compared to the physical layer.  Most people can envision hardware that has been 
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connected to a network, but the logical layer comprises the relationships between the 
hardware and the connections between various portions of the networks that are not tied 
to any specific path or network nodes.  An example of this is seen anytime an individual 
uses a web browser to connect to a website.  The user does not state how the browser will 
connect to the various servers between the physical terminal they are sitting at and the 
server hosting the website at potentially any location in the world.26 
The final layer shown in Figure 4 is known as the cyber-persona layer.  This layer 
is more abstract than the logical layer described previously.  This layer represents the 
digital persona of a user, or actor, in cyberspace, which consists of the actual individuals 
on then network.  This portion of the cyber domains utilizes the rules applied in the 
logical network layer for individuals to operate in cyberspace.  These cyber-personas can 
relate to an actual individual or entity; it may incorporate some biographical or corporate 
data, e-mail and IP addresses, and potentially web pages, and phone numbers.  Where this 
gets complicated, an individual may maintain more than one cyber-persona which may be 
a representation of the individual.  Conversely, a single cyber-persona could have 
multiple users.  This leads to one of the more complex issues with cyberspace.  It can be 
difficult to attribute any actions or responsibility to a particular cyber-persona to the 
actual group or individual running cyber operations.  This cyber-persona’s trail may be in 
multiple virtual locations that are not necessarily linked to a physical location.  Networks 
are globally interconnected, and enable vast amounts of information to be shared between 
individuals, corporations, and governments.27  
                                                 
26 Ibid., I2-4. 
27 Ibid. 
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The White House's International Strategy for Cyberspace sums up the importance 
of cyber space, and lays down some foundational goals to the development of norms for 
operating in cyberspace.  The U.S. strategy declares, "Activities undertaken in cyberspace 
have consequences for our lives in physical space, and we must work towards building 
the rule of law, to prevent the risks of logging on from outweighing its benefits."28  While 
the internet was developed to aid in collaboration and information sharing, the ability for 
criminals and state actors to exploit this ability has become a very real cause for concern 
in the last couple of decades.  These threats range from extortion, fraud, and identity theft 
affecting individual users to concerted efforts to steal intellectual property reducing 
national competitiveness and innovation.  Cyberspace has a unique set of impacts that 
transcend national borders, and can endanger peace and security if cyber-attacks affect 
national interests.29 
The U.S. will operate and defend cyberspace while operating within defined core 
principles of maintaining fundamental freedoms, privacy, and the free flow of 
information.  The U.S. is committed to the freedom of expression, but not at the expense 
of public safety and protection of citizens.  This is further defined by the incitement of 
imminent violence, exploitation of children, and organizing terrorist activities not 
consistent with the rule of law.  Additionally, privacy is of paramount importance in 
cyberspace.  The nature of personal data and information requires safekeeping to ensure 
protection of the individual and the national interests.  However, the need for privacy 
must balance with the ability of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute 
                                                 
28 The White House, “International Strategy For Cyberspace - Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a 
Networked World,” May 2011, 3, accessed March 30, 2014, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/internationalstrategy_cyberspace.pdf. 
29 Ibid., 4. 
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those who would misuse information or cyberspace for illicit or violent means.  The free 
flow of information should not be a choice between information and security of the 
network.  National-level filters and firewalls provide an illusion of security, but can 
dampen growth.  Cyberspace is a means of collaboration for individuals, business, and 
nations alike.  The importance of a common access to prevent unfair advantages cannot 
be understated.  The continued technological growth of the twenty-first century requires 
that cyberspace provides a means for the prosperity of all users.30 
Chapter one established the foundational language required to discuss operations 
in both the space and cyberspace domains.  It illustrated not only the orbits, but also the 
unique operational considerations that are required when considering any sort of 
operation in space.  Additionally, the examination of the details that delineate various 
portions of cyber infrastructure shows areas of connection that may have been overlooked 
in this exploration of the threat environment.  This foundational information is key in the 
continued exploration of the topic of space and cyberspace threats in the upcoming 
chapters.   
  
                                                 
30 Ibid., 5. 
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CHAPTER TWO – DEFINING THE THREAT 
 
Both space and cyberspace technologies have become force multipliers for 
military operations.  The difficulty of attributing attacks to space and cyberspace assets 
hinder the ability to apply deterrence effectively.  The continued United States reliance 
on these technologies makes them an attractive target to both emerging and regional 
powers.  Although these technologies are separate from a policy perspective, both space 
and cyberspace technologies coexist in their operational employment.  Applying 
deterrence theory in the space and cyberspace domains is not as straightforward as seen 
previously with nuclear weapons.  Cyber technology in particular has become a nearly 
every day event in the defense and security world.   Additionally, there is significant 
overlap in the technologies associated with both of these domains.  For each satellite 
ground station, numerous computer networks are vulnerable to cyber-attack.  It is 
challenging to find a number to characterize the threat to systems based on space 
weapons and cyber-attacks.  There are very clear and documented trends showing an 
uptick in activity from the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, and a 
parallel trend in the number of reported cyber incidents as the threat becomes more 
pervasive.   
A 2010 RAND Corporation report supporting Project Air Force used the term 
"Targets of Growing Attractiveness."  This term describes the conditions of space use we 
see in support of combat operations today.  The 1991 Gulf War, opened the eyes of 
leaders in countries around the world to the level of conventional weapons dominance 
afforded by a deep investment in space technology.  Real-time communications; 
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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites; and positioning, 
navigation, and timing (PNT) coupled with advanced conventional weapons transformed 
the U.S. military to a formidable fighting force.  This reliance on space by the U.S. makes 
our space assets valuable resource for targeting.  For a country to remove this advantage, 
it would neutralize our conventional weapons advantage in future conflicts.31 
This report argues the "infrastructure, policies, and attitudes that both enable and 
constrain U.S. space operations in the current environment are, in many ways, unchanged 
from when they were developed during the Cold War. This leaves the United States 
exposed to the risk of a surprise attack in space unless a deterrence regime can be 
developed to restore first-strike stability in that domain."  This demonstrates the dichotomy 
in the conventional deterrence thinking of the cold war, and shows the limitations of current 
systems in this arena.32 
During an interview conducted for the 60 Minutes segment "The Battle Above," 
David Martin conducted an interview of General John Hyten, the commander of Air 
Force Space Command (AFSPC).  This segment illustrates the fundamental change in 
approach from the nuclear world to that of space operations.  Journalist David Martin, 
states in the interview, "Deterrence in the nuclear world was built on weapons."33  
Highlighting the change, General Hyten responds with, "[Deterrence] in the space world 
has got to be built on a little bit different construct.  It's the ability to convince an 
adversary that if they attack us, they will fail."34  General Hyten’s testimony to House 
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Corporation, 2010), 13, accessed March 18, 2015, 
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33 David Martin, “The Battle Above,” 60 Minutes, last modified April 26, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, 
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Armed Services Committee on the National Security Space Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 
17 provides a few more details on this earlier statement.  He noted that, “Not all space 
faring countries are friendly to the United States or agree to establish and observe 
international norms in the space domain.  Adversaries are developing kinetic, directed-
energy and cyber tools to deny, degrade and destroy our space capabilities.  They 
understand our reliance on space, and they understand the competitive advantage we 
derive from space.  The need for vigilance has never been greater.”35 
One of the key initiatives to further the space deterrence posture was the creation 
of the Joint Interagency Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) initiative.  This organization 
will be located at Schriever AFB, CO, and will facilitate information sharing across the 
national security space enterprise.  The organization has begun operational 
experimentation and is planning to incorporate any results into standard operating 
procedures on January 1, 2017.36  According to General Hyten, “The JICSpOC is focused 
on space defense, and is developing new space-system operational concepts, and tactics, 
techniques and procedures in support of both the DoD and Intelligence Community. 
Fusing the operations of our space systems and intelligence capabilities in real-time will 
enhance our ability to track, monitor, analyze and predict irresponsible and dangerous 
activity in space.”  The JICSpOC was designed to enhance the nation’s deterrent posture 
by demonstrating that the U.S. is prepared to respond should an adversary attempt to 
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threaten our space capabilities. 37  The initial testing of the JICSpOC initiative has 
completed two scenarios as of January 22, 2016, and has generated several lessons 
learned during the process.  These two scenarios have begun to look at the problem of 
characterizing and attributing threats to satellites.  Over the years, space leaders have had 
difficulty determining whether an outage on a satellite is naturally occurring or the result 
of an attack.  The initial testing is working through establishing the various sources of 
data for decision makers.  This will allow each event to be looked at in a consistent and 
holistic manner and develop options.38  Although this organization is in its infancy, the 
benefit of synthesizing data for policy makers to make the right decisions in a time of 
crisis is or paramount importance.   
While General Hyten's comments were informative on the future of space 
deterrence, it is necessary to investigate the policy statements in the 2010 National Space 
Policy.  This policy states, "The United States will employ a variety of measures to help 
assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right 
of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and 
contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to 
attack them."39   
The U.S. aims to increase stability in space through the development of both 
domestic and international measures to promote safe and responsible operations in space.  
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This will be enabled by improved information collection and sharing for collision 
avoidance to prevent any growth in space debris as well as strengthening measures to 
mitigate debris.  As mentioned in chapter one, space debris is a large threat to space 
operations, and every effort to reduce this threat should be pursued by all parties involved 
in space.  Additionally, this policy begins to establish the framework for protection of 
space systems and infrastructures and the interdependence between space and 
information systems.40   
Additionally, this policy requires not only the assurance of space systems, but 
their resiliency as well.  Chapter three will describe the various threats to space systems, 
and the development of resilient space systems is a means to reduce the overall 
vulnerability of on-orbit space assets.  Specifically, the National Space Policy aims to 
provide guidance to developers and operators of space systems to develop infrastructure 
that is protected against, disruption, degradation, and destruction from environmental, 
design, or hostile causes.41  
The space policy is mirrored by the most recent DoD Cyber Policy stating, "As 
DoD builds its Cyber Mission Force and overall capabilities, DoD assumes that the 
deterrence of cyberattacks on U.S. interests will not be achieved through the articulation 
of cyber policies alone, but through the totality of U.S. actions, including declaratory 
policy, substantial indications and warning capabilities, defensive posture, effective 
response procedures, capabilities, and the overall resiliency of U.S. networks and 
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systems."42  The key difference shown is in the cyber policy's approach to use a totality 
of actions.43   
The most prevalent example of deterrence application in space can be observed 
with the buildup of Chinese counterspace activities, and to a lesser extent Russia.  James 
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, submitted a report highlighting that both 
Russia and China are continuing to pursue weapon systems capable of attacking on-orbit 
satellites.44  China is developing a full spectrum of counterspace capabilities to include 
both ground-based and exoatmospheric weapons.45  "Beijing appears to be developing 
this array of capabilities to deter U.S. strikes against China’s expanding satellite 
infrastructure; challenge U.S. information superiority in a conflict; and deny, degrade, 
disrupt, disable, or destroy U.S. satellites if necessary."  China has demonstrated the 
capabilities to threaten every orbit regime from low earth orbit (LEO) to medium earth 
orbit (MEO) and geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) with a series of tests in 2007 and 
2013 respectively.46  
In addition to the technological development, China is developing a space 
deterrence doctrine that reflects how they view the space environment.  Like the United 
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States, China views satellites and space technology as essential to military operations.  
Chinese military theorists also understand the competition between ASAT development 
and the need for satellite defense (or resiliency in U.S. terms).  Writers of Chinese 
doctrine write, "[T]hat to be prepared for space conflicts, besides having the ability to 
strike the enemy’s satellites, it is also necessary to improve the survivability of one’s own 
satellites."47  This statement shows striking parallels between Beijing and U.S. 
development of doctrine.  Both countries are going down similar paths to ensure the 
availability of space systems during times of conflict.  This includes resistance to 
jamming, satellite mobility, enhanced space situational awareness, and disaggregation.48  
Similar to the U.S., China recognizes that protection of ground stations is just as essential 
as protecting the satellite.  Moreover, the technical approaches used by each country are 
very similar.  The need to maintain encrypted links and anti-jamming technologies, as 
well as minimizing the computer network threat is very important to ensure "the secrecy, 
validity, and integrity of one's own information system."49 
Chinese statements place the importance of space deterrence on par with nuclear, 
conventional, and information deterrence.  Although space deterrence is seen as 
important, it is also still under development in contemporary Chinese thinking.  This 
deterrence theory is being developed along the lines of “People’s War of Deterrence,” but 
as with any fledgling technology there is much work to be done.  Bao Shixiu, Professor 
of Military Affairs and Senior Research Fellow at the PLA Academy of Military 
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Sciences, posits that the overall deterrence theory will evolve along the overall “active 
defense” scenario already employed by the PLA.  Professor Shixiu writes that, “The basic 
necessity to preserve stability through the development of deterrent forces as propounded 
by Mao and Deng remains valid in the context of space.”50 
The deterrence theories put forward by Mao and Deng generally resemble the 
method of deterrence used during the Cold War by the United States and Soviet Union.  
Building on this deterrence paradigm, Chinese writers show the need for three conditions 
to be met for strategic deterrence to be viable.  The country must possess a deterrent 
capability, the country must be willing to use that deterrent, and the country must be able 
to communicate those capabilities and the determination to use them against an adversary 
as deemed necessary.  However, this is where the similarities to the legacy of nuclear 
weapons end.  According Professor Shixiu, this primary difference is based on, “a taboo 
on the use of space weapons, the threshold of their use will be lower than that of nuclear 
weapons because of their conventional characteristics.  Space debris may threaten the 
space assets of other ‘third party’ countries, but the level of destruction, especially in 
terms of human life, could be far less than nuclear weapons or potentially even 
conventional weapons."51   
This developed method of deterrence developed by the Chinese suggests, “an 
active defense will entail a robust deterrent force that has the ability to inflict 
unacceptable damage on an adversary."52  In addition to this approach, Chinese authors 
recognize the value of disaggregation of space systems and their associated information 
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systems.  Disaggregation is the means of dispersing missions and payloads on multiple 
satellite buses to complicate targeting by other nations.  By hosting these various 
payloads on foreign satellites, it poses political and diplomatic challenges to their attack.  
This requires factoring the impacts of engaging a satellite owned by another country or 
commercial consortia.  Utilizing third-party satellite operators to provide leased 
transponder space for communications resiliency complicates the intelligence picture 
required to employ a retaliatory systems against the targeted satellite.  In this case, it 
would likely require using a system that had reversible effects to meet the goals of the 
attacking country without potentially damaging a leased system of a non-belligerent 
country.  Additionally, the desire to deny the adversaries’ use of their own space systems 
during a conflict leads into the existing nuclear deterrence strategy of China.  Beijing’s 
view on the denial of missile warning satellite capabilities to preserve their nuclear 
deterrent is different from approaches used by the United States. 
During the Cold War, missile-warning systems are sacrosanct, and engaging one 
of those systems would be interpreted as a precursor to an attack.  It remains to be seen if 
China will develop the same view.  Professor Shixiu writes that China, “will develop 
anti-satellite and space weapons capable of effectively taking out an enemy’s space 
system, in order to constitute a reliable and credible defense strategy."  And he further 
states, “under the conditions of American strategic dominance in space, reliable 
deterrents in space will decrease the possibility of the United States attacking Chinese 
space assets."53  The approach utilized by the U.S. would likely be similar, but there are 
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no official American policy statements to overtly support to what degree of deterrence 
strategy would be employed.   
The interesting approach to the evolving Chinese strategy on deterrence is the 
lack of conversation on the ramifications of the employment of anti-satellite weapons 
with regard to space debris.  Even in a limited engagement, it is conceivable the amount 
of debris generated could limit the use of an orbital regime for any space-faring nation.  
Not only is this a consideration for military payloads, but civil space and manned 
spaceflight would ultimately suffer.  This disconnect could be similar to the 2007 ASAT 
test where the PLA conducted the test without civilian leadership knowledge.  Since that 
test, there are indications that debris planning has factored into future tests like the 2013 
ASAT test.54 
An illustration of the challenges in applying deterrence to space and specifically 
cyberspace are seen in the Department of Defense's Cyber Strategy.  This policy states 
that, "Deterrence is partially a function of perception.  It works by convincing a potential 
adversary that it will suffer unacceptable costs if it conducts an attack on the United 
States, and by decreasing the likelihood that a potential adversary’s attack will succeed. 
The United States must be able to declare or display effective response capabilities to 
deter an adversary from initiating an attack; develop effective defensive capabilities to 
deny a potential attack from succeeding; and strengthen the overall resilience of U.S. 
systems to withstand a potential attack if it penetrates the United States’ defenses. In 
addition, the United States requires strong intelligence, forensics, and indications and 
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warning capabilities to reduce anonymity in cyberspace and increase confidence in 
attribution."55   
This policy shows several key points that will challenge the deterrence value of 
the United States in these domains.  Specifically, the U.S. will need to convince a 
potential adversary that this attack will result in unacceptable cost.  This task will be 
difficult enough against another nation, which will have an infrastructure of value to be 
held at risk to prevent such an attack.56  Additionally, a deterrence strategy must contain 
elements that can be tailored to support operations against non-state actors, terrorist 
organizations, or individuals engaged in cyber operations.  A National Institute of Public 
Policy study analyzed various terrorist organizations, and noted non-state actors could be 
deterred with various measures.  The methods fell into two categories.  The employment 
of punishment, both demonstrated and threatened, for operations launched by the non-
state actor.  The next method was to deny the objectives of the non-state actor.  The 
nature of these methods is outside the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that 
it is possible to construct a deterrence policy that can be used effectively against these 
sorts of individuals and organizations.57  Additionally, the U.S. must be able to display 
the willingness to engage in a proportional retaliatory strike in the space or cyberspace 
domains.  Whereas the ability to respond is challenging, the most difficult portion of this 
strategy is the ability to detect and attribute this level of attack to the perpetrator to make 
the case on why retaliation was required.58     
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While the DoD Cyber Strategy lays out the most thorough definition of deterrence 
of the space and cyberspace domains, it is important to note with regard to attribution, 
that this paper will focus on a subset of weapon systems.  Specifically, it will apply to 
cyber-attacks, jamming, and potential co-orbital ASAT weapons.  These methods do 
require some level of technological sophistication, but they will maintain some level of 
deniability versus that of a China's demonstration during the 2007 test direct ascent 
ASAT.59  The inherent capabilities of some of these new technologies to degrade or 
destroy a satellite complicate the deterrence posture.  Without clear attribution, how can 
deterrence work?   
Attribution is fundamental to deterrence, but attribution requires a significant 
investment in intelligence, indications60, and warning.  This requires a mechanism for all 
sources of intelligence collection as well as effective dissemination of information to 
reduce the anonymity of both state and non-state actors alike.  Detecting an event is only 
the first step, the attack must be tracked to the point of origin, and if possible the 
perpetrators of the attack must be determined.  This can be done by comparing against 
known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and employment methods observed 
during testing and real world events.61   
The DoD Cyber Strategy mentions the benefits that public and private attribution 
can play in dissuading a cyber-attack.  Additionally, the policy addresses whether a 
military strike in retaliation is warranted in the event of an attack in cyberspace by a state 
or non-state actor.  In the event that military action is not used, the government may 
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leverage a combination of diplomatic and law enforcement actions.  The U.S. employed 
this method to attempt to deter future cyber economic espionage actions by China.  The 
U.S. used "verifiable and attributable" data to establish a dialog with Beijing expressing 
concern with the amount of intellectual property stolen from U.S. companies.  This 
concern is based on the reduction in competitiveness in the business markets by the loss of 
this intellectual property, and the resulting strategic threat and reduced stability.  The 
Justice Department indicted five members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for 
these thefts.  It remains to be seen if this action will have any measureable deterrence 
value in the cyber domain.62 
A final consideration for deterrence challenges deals with common understanding.  
It is unknown if the PLA and the civilian leadership of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) subscribe to a common deterrence theory.  Most of the publications are from the 
PLA, and reflect the current approach to strategy from that portion of the government.  
As was mentioned earlier, this was seen in the civilian leadership's lack of understanding 
of world leaders’ opinions after the 2007 ASAT test.  The PLA suggests that future 
ASAT tests remain unpublicized to foster uncertainty.63  As seen from research from the 
Cold war era, there were significant disconnects between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
on deterrence application.  It is important to understand the Chinese views on deterrence 
to ensure whatever posture is implemented will be effective.  The U.S. views on 
deterrence could be flawed, there are more factors in deterrence than lethality or mutual 
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threats, what is rational to the U.S. may not be rational to China, deterrence could be far 
less predictable than anticipated, and finally adjusting the weapons posture may have 
limited impacts on stability.64 
To maintain the overpowering conventional capabilities of the United States and 
to minimize the economic threat of a significant loss of space systems, it is necessary to 
form an effective form of deterrence for space and cyberspace.  According to Dean 
Chang, a Senior Research Fellow of the Asian Studies Center, the writings of the PLA 
posit, "a military must be able to exploit space. Only the high ground of space can 
provide the opportunity to gather information; transmit it rapidly, securely, and reliably; 
and exploit it promptly.  PLA writings describe space as essential for reconnaissance and 
surveillance, communications, navigation, weather forecasting, and battle damage 
assessment.  A military that is capable of effective joint operations can also deter an 
opponent.  Thus, space capabilities strengthen conventional deterrence as well as 
deterring in their own right."65  The Chinese strategy is remarkably similar to that of the 
U.S. in the sense that these systems will be used to possibly deter future conflicts, and if 
necessary, fight and win in future conflicts.   
This statement made by Mr. Cheng mentions that effectively operating in a joint 
environment will also deter an opponent.  This seems to mirror a statement made by the 
U.S. Department of Defense in the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC) 
that, “deterrence requires a grand strategy that considers adversary-specific deterrence on 
a global scale, incorporates cross-[area of responsibility (AOR)] effects, and factors in 
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second and third order effects. This deterrence strategy must be integrated within a 
national deterrence strategy that integrates and brings to bear all elements of national 
power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic.”66  Effectively China will 
employ these sort of joint operations to increase deterrence capabilities as the PLA 
continues to develop and employ anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) technologies in 
their sphere of influence to deter the U.S. from interfering in operations that China feels 
important.  The Chinese employment of anti-satellite weapons is the latest extension of 
A2/AD into warfare with the intent of holding U.S. space assets at risk.     
Space systems will continue to advance with new technology, and their 
importance will continue to increase.  For space deterrence to remain viable, the United 
States will have to make changes to ensure deterrence viability.  First, the U.S. must 
continue to maintain a robust space capability.  This includes modernizing sensors and 
technology, communications capabilities, and focusing on the enhancing the resiliency of 
ground stations and links that are required for command and control of space missions to 
be possible.  Furthermore, an investment in enhanced spacecraft monitoring to deter 
command intrusions and early detection of jamming is paramount.  As mentioned earlier, 
"attribution—knowing who is performing what kinds of action—is essential for 
successful deterrence."  This will require a larger investment in situational awareness 
platforms.67 
Mr. Cheng notes that China’s space program is a growing factor in U.S. space 
planning.  As counterspace capabilities mature, it is no longer acceptable to operate under 
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the pretense that space is a neutral zone.  The U.S. should increase investment in 
alternatives to space systems.  The DoD must be able to operate without space support.  
This requires a re-learning of wartime skills, but by reducing the reliance on space 
systems this will send the message to other countries that negating space assets will not 
prevent effective military action.  To build on the approach of disaggregation onto 
commercial satellites, more unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications linked 
should be moved off dedicated military assets to reduce the likelihood of jamming.  This 
will retain the benefits of battlefield surveillance systems while complicating an 
adversary's counterspace targeting.68   
The final area for improvement is increasing intelligence on foreign counterspace 
capabilities.  Currently China has invested huge amounts of resources along the space 
deterrence lines, and that does not mean other countries will not make similar 
investments in the future.  China's lack of transparency in the development of capabilities 
causes uncertainty.  This lack of understanding of Beijing's policy works to their 
advantage.  This allows China to influence other governments with stated policies 
describing detailed deterrence strategies during peacetime and conflict.  The U.S. 
government needs to prioritize intelligence collection and expand the pool of experts to 
bolster the translation of documents.69 
In closing, the importance of space cannot be overstated.  Not only does space 
technology allow for rapid communication, it affords the opportunity for great scientific 
and economic growth.  The space and cyberspace environments will continue to be 
contested by the U.S. and near peer nations, and overtime new nations and capabilities 
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will enter those domains.  As stated by the National Security Strategy, "The world is 
connected by shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and oceans—that enable the free flow of 
people, goods, services, and ideas. They are the arteries of the global economy and civil 
society, and access is at risk due to increased competition and provocative behaviors. 
Therefore, we will continue to promote rules for responsible behavior while making sure 
we have the capabilities to assure access to these shared spaces."70  The space and 
cyberspace domains are critically important to the national security of the United States 
and its allies, and serious attention is needed to maintain the space systems that ensure 
conventional warfare dominance when needed for operations around the globe. 
The overall threat of space and cyberspace weapons employment will continue to 
grow, and that will influence policy development for the United States.  The next chapter 
will focus on the different weapon systems that could be employed in these domains, and 
the specific deterrence challenges of these systems.  This continues to build on the 
language that is specific to both the space and cyberspace domains working toward the 
real-world application of these systems in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER THREE – UNIQUE DETERRENCE CHARACTERISTICS OF SPACE 
AND CYBERSPACE 
 
There is enough uncertainty in space and cyberspace where it will be difficult to 
prove the source, the agency, or the nation conducting hostile operations against U.S. 
platforms.  Space control is the means that the U.S. will use to protect space assets 
through defensive operations as well as conduct offensive operations.  China and Russia 
may be developing similar capabilities, but they may be listed under different 
terminology.  From the perspective of the U.S. National Space Policy, “The United States 
will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible 
parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from 
interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied 
space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.”71   
As mentioned earlier, adversaries of the United States will develop and employ 
capabilities with the intent to neutralize U.S. space advantage.  Those nations employing 
offensive space control technologies will leverage a series of tactics that will range from 
reversible effects to the destruction of a space asset.  These capabilities will target space 
systems, forces, information links, and any potential third party space capabilities.  These 
are commonly referred to as the “Five Ds,” uncluding:72 
• Deception operations leverage, “the manipulation, distortion, or falsification 
of information to induce adversaries to react in a manner contrary to their 
interests.”73 
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• Disruption operations will force, “temporary impairment of some of all of a 
space system’s capability to produce effects, usually without physical 
damage.”74 
• Denial will force, “temporary elimination of some of all of a space system’s 
capability to produce effects, usually without physical damage.”75 
• Degradation will cause, “permanent impairment of some or all of a space 
systems capability to produce results, usually with physical damage.”76 
• Destruction is the, “permanent elimination of all of a space system’s 
capabilities to produce effects’ usually with physical damage.”77 
 
 
Counterspace Weapons Technology 
Several technologies could be employed against U.S. space assets to reduce their 
effectiveness.  For this paper, we will focus on electronic attack weapons, directed energy 
weapons, and kinetic kill vehicles.  Some space weapons involve the use of 
electromagnetic energy and directed energy to attack an adversary.  Typically, this is 
referred to as electronic attack (EA) or jamming.  Jammers emit signals powerful enough to 
override the system generated signals to a satellite to prevent the reception of authentic data 
on the satellite.  All space systems are susceptible to uplink and downlink jamming, but the 
jammer must be in the same band as the targeted satellite.  Over the next few pages, I will 
explain the differences between jammers.  At a high level, uplink jammers must be nearly 
as powerful as the satellite ground stations emitter to ensure jamming.  On the other hand, 
ground-based downlink jammers do not need as much power to be effective since they are 
relying on just overpowering the already diminished signal that has traveled from space and 
through the Earth’s atmosphere.  Jammers leverage the fact that satellites require constant 
upkeep from the ground to maintain operations.  It is often taken for granted that the 
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command and control of satellites occurs without a large team of people and a sophisticated 
system to uplink those command to ensure payload management, station keeping, and state 
of health services.  Attacking the uplink during critical periods can degrade the mission 
performance, but jamming effectiveness can be mitigated by further automation of 
satellites and ensuring satellite ground stations are placed in ways to mitigate the fielding of 
a jammer in the satellite footprint.  This mitigation leads to the need for downlink 
jamming.78 
Uplink signals come in two varieties, signals for retransmission like 
communications signals, and command uplinks to the satellite for mission operations.  
Conducting uplink-jamming against the satellite payload is an attractive strategy.  From an 
attribution standpoint, the jammer can be located anywhere in the satellite’s footprint 
making it difficult to locate, and the jammer can indirectly affect all the users that rely on 
the retransmission of that signal.  Uplink jamming requires that the jamming signal be 
approximately the same frequency as the target signal.  This signal will be transmitted to 
the target satellite on the same transponder as the target signal that will lead to the onboard 
transponder to not be able to distinguish the jamming signal from the target signal.  This 
inability to distinguish between signals results in the loss of or corrupted downlink to the 
affected users.  This type of jamming does require the support of intelligence agencies to 
provide SIGINT and OSINT support to this sort of jamming.79   
Whereas uplink jamming targets the satellite itself, downlink jamming is geared 
toward affecting ground based users exclusively.  Downlink jamming is typically used to 
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disrupt GPS and in some cases satellite communications (SATCOM) broadcasts.  Similar 
to uplink jamming, downlink jamming requires knowledge of the signal to closely match 
the parameters to be effective.  This will either be done via an aircraft over a regional area 
or by using ground based jammers to accomplish the desired EA mission.  The benefit of 
utilizing an aircraft is based on the altitude that it can operate.  The higher the aircraft’s 
altitude, the larger the affected area.  Additionally, this can help jam around terrain that 
would otherwise mask the jamming signal.  In some cases, downlink jamming would be 
considered to impact satellite command and control.  In most cases, satellite operators do 
not like to “command in the blind” since most systems require some level of command 
verification to send the next command.  Downlink jamming would prevent the ground 
station from receiving the telemetry link and would cause the very scenario mentioned 
previously.  With regard to GPS downlink jamming, the Russians market a system roughly 
the size of a pack of cigarettes that can deny GPS users access out to eighty kilometers, and 
a slightly larger one can push that number out to nearly 200 kilometers.80 
The final type of RF weapon would rely on spoofing.  This is the capability to 
capture, alter, and retransmit a signal in a way to mislead a recipient.  This is primarily seen 
with sophisticated GPS downlink jamming.  Certain systems will capture and retransmit 
the GPS signal just a few seconds later than it would receive them at higher power leading 
to a large position shifts.  If spoofing were to be used on a satellite, it would take a 
sophisticated intelligence operation sponsored by a nation.  This would require resources to 
capture, decrypt, and exploit the end-to-end satellite command and telemetry links.  This 
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could lead to commands being inserted into a system leading to component failure, and 
would be exceptionally discrete and deniable.81   
The most important thing to understand with regard to weapons systems employing 
jamming, is that those systems are primarily concerned with generating effects that are hard 
to attribute to a point of origin and that are also reversible.  These systems operate with the 
intent of deceiving, disrupting, and denying the use of a particular asset.  Additionally, 
these systems are relatively inexpensive to field and many nations without sophisticated 
space programs could acquire and employ them to interrupt space communications in there 
are of operations.   
The next category of space weapons are directed energy (DE) weapons, and more 
specifically lasers.  The employment of standoff directed energy weapons would utilize 
either ground or air based platforms.  The benefit of these platforms it the ability to engage 
multiple targets as well as obfuscate the attack origin.  Under ideal conditions, with good 
geometric access, these weapons can complete an engagement in seconds.  This highlights 
the benefits to the sunk cost of these platforms.  Directed energy attacks likely do not give 
off many external intelligence indicators that would lead to a definitive engagement time.  
With these sort of weapons, the degradation may not be immediately apparent leading to 
difficulty tracing the attack time to a definitive point in the orbit.82 
  Laser systems include coherent radiation, aligned waveforms, and other devices 
operating near the optical wavelengths.  These systems operate by delivering energy to the 
surface of the targeted satellite.  The gradual or rapid absorption of the laser energy will 
lead to the buildup of heat leading to thermal damage to the payload or satellite bus.  From 
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a practical standpoint, anti-sensor lasers could be used against targets against satellites at 
various altitude.  These systems require a great deal of power to focus the laser to 
propagate the wave over hundreds or thousands of kilometers to deliver lethal energy to the 
target.  Some of the system capabilities for these systems include megawatt class lasers for 
long range weapons would require a high degree of beam quality, a high quality beam 
director, and a very high precision pointing system.  Several factors impact the operational 
effectiveness of the laser, these mainly concern the ability to condition the beam to 
compensate for varying atmospheric effects.  There is some research concerning space 
based lasers, however, most testing and operational systems to date have been ground and 
air based laser systems.83 
Unlike the jammers described earlier, directed energy weapons would be employed 
to cause degradation or destruction of a space system.  Additionally, these systems will be 
difficult to detect and determine the point of origin leading to the possibility a satellite 
would have failed for electrical or environmental reasons instead of from hostile 
employment of directed energy.  These weapons require a significant amount of technology 
and resources to develop, and that would limit their employment to nations such as Russia 
or China.   
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Kinetic Kill Vehicles (KKVs) have existed since the Cold 
War, and were in development by both the U.S. and Soviet Union.  The development of 
these weapons did seem to slow down or stop after the Cold War.  With regard to KKV 
platforms, the interceptors can be divided into various categories.  Primarily, I will speak to 
the direct ascent and co-orbital variants.  These weapons are launched either from the 
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ground or from aircraft into an intercept trajectory or orbit that will pass in close proximity 
to the target satellite.  Either the onboard guidance systems or the interceptor, ground based 
sensors and control, or a combination of the two will be used to steer the weapon to the 
target.   
In recent history, China completed a successful ASAT test in 2007 and the United 
States used this capability to destroy a failed satellite before it re-entered Earth’s 
atmosphere over Canada with a one thousand pounds of hydrazine propellant.  Operation 
Burnt Frost occurred on February 20, 2008, and this utilized a sea launched Standard 
Missile-3 (SM-3) from the USS Lake Erie.  This operation resulted in the destruction of the 
defunct satellite preventing the toxic propellant from entering the atmosphere.  
Additionally, the intercept occurred at an altitude where the majority of orbital debris re-
entered within forty-eight hours, and the remaining debris within a few days.84   
The next group of interceptors falls into the co-orbital variety.  These interceptors 
will launch from Earth into a temporary phasing orbit to allow the interceptor to align with 
the target satellite in a different orbit.  Based on the need to conduct an on orbit intercept, 
these systems are more complex to develop and field.  They involve having on-orbit 
capabilities to maintain systems in the phasing orbit for some number of hours before they 
maneuver to the intercept point.  This also requires a larger booster to loft the satellite into 
orbit to account for the additional propellant needed for conducting the final maneuver to 
intercept.  These systems could be used to attack a satellite a few hours after launch, or 
could remain in orbit for years before being utilized for an attack.  These interceptors have 
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the potential to engage a satellite out of view of a sensor field and mimic an orbital 
collision, leading to some level of question on what happened.  These ASATs could be 
designed to look like a functioning satellite with some sort of small satellite launcher 
embedded into the satellite.    This makes it difficult to assess the point of origin of the 
attack. 
The core premise behind a KKV is the weapon will close and engage the target 
with either a hit to kill or explosive warhead.  These weapons can be utilized as a direct 
ascent (DA) or co-orbital weapon after launch.  What that really means with a DA ASAT, 
is the interceptor would be launched from the ground on an intercept course with the target 
satellite.  This sort of employment would have a relatively short engagement timeline and if 
other nations did not have sensors watching, could be missed by intelligence agencies.  
This could lead to some level of deniability that the targeted satellite either exploded or 
broke up on-orbit for reasons that are not explained.  Conversely, the co-orbital ASAT 
would be launched into a similar orbit as the target, then execute a rendezvous with the 
target, and finally engage with the target by colliding or utilizing another form of kinetic 
attack.  Further engagement options with co-orbital ASATs could include launching 
smaller micro satellites from a host satellite that could be utilized for more untraceable 
style of attacks.  
An example of this sort of satellite could be seen from China’s testing of the BX-1 
microsatellite.  This satellite measures approximately forty centimeters on each side and 
weighs around 40 kilograms.  This type of satellite can be further developed and its size 
reduced to under space surveillance tracking levels, making it a very real threat in the 
future.  This satellite was primarily used to inspect an orbital body, test data relay 
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functionality, and conduct some limited proximity operations.  Some would argue that 
these are the same capabilities required to field a co-orbital ASAT.85       
However, the only recent testing, development, and fielding of these capabilities is 
being seen with the People’s Republic of China.  As recent as July 23, 2014, China has 
conducted space launches on similar profile as the January 2007 test that resulted in the 
deliberate destruction of a weather satellite that was no longer in service.  This results in 
hundreds, if not thousands, or pieces of orbital debris.  Unlike the 2007 test, the 2014 test 
did not contain an impact.  It was however, a suspicious profile that has alarmed countries 
concerned with continued space operations.  Additionally, May 13, 2013, China launched 
an object into a ballistic trajectory with an altitude of greater than 30,000 kilometers.  This 
resulted in an orbital track that approached near the geosynchronous belt where numerous 
communications and weather satellites reside.  What is interesting about this “peaceful” 
demonstration is the vehicle re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere nine and a half hours after 
launch without being observed dropping off nay payloads on orbit.  This test is especially a 
concern based on the expanded capability to threaten satellites in both MEO and GEO 
orbits.  Furthermore, a kinetic engagement at those altitudes could lead to a catastrophic 
debris incident rendering whole swaths of the GEO belt unusable for space missions.86  To 
date, China has not publicly acknowledged any additional anti-satellite programs, but PLA 
writings emphasize the need of, “‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s 
reconnaissance ... and communications satellites,’” which suggests that MEO and GEO, 
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specifically navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of future 
attacks designed to “‘blind and deafen the enemy.’”  This is consistent with reports from 
PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations that “‘destroying or capturing 
satellites and other sensors ... will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and 
[make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.’”87 
All of the kinetic kill vehicles described represent some of the most complex 
systems that could be developed for space warfare.  These systems are limited to nations 
that have their own space programs, and can invest significant resources into the 
development of these systems.  Similar to the directed energy systems, these platforms 
would primarily be used to degrade or destroy other satellites.  Furthermore, they would 
be difficult to detect based on their potential size, and the level of sophistication of the 
targeted nation’s satellite to maintain a high level of space situational awareness to track 
these potential weapon systems in space. 
 
Space Stability 
The RAND report Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space raises several 
points that are germane to this topic.  The U.S. depends on the use of space systems for 
all facets of national security.  This includes satellite communications systems for real-
time communications and collaboration anywhere in the world, GPS for precision timing 
and navigation, and ISR systems for intelligence collection and targeting.88  Space 
systems are inherently vulnerable and very little is currently available to harden existing 
systems against attack.  The United States Fiscal Year 2016 budget has allocated fund to 
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further the development of resilient space systems to continue space mission assurance.  
Space Mission Assurance is the means of securing space-based services so that U.S. 
forces will have those capabilities whenever they are required.89  That stems from 
unknown requirements to address the upcoming space threats, and the practical matter of 
cost to build a robust satellite that can operate in a congested and denied environment.  
Forrest Morgan, a twenty-seven year veteran of the U.S. Air Force and a senior political 
scientist at the RAND Corporation specializing in crisis stability, preemptive and 
preventive attack, escalation management, deterrence, information operations and the 
operational resilience of U.S. airpower in the Asia-Pacific Theater, asked a simple 
question that I hoped to be able to answer with this paper – “Can future enemies be 
deterred from attacking U.S. space systems?  To what degree is deterrence reliable, and 
under what circumstances might it fail?”90 
The United States is heavily reliant on space assets for real-time communication, 
ISR, PNT, and too many other services to list that a loss would be catastrophic to say the 
least.  Dr. Morgan characterizes the threat in which an adversary would weigh the risks 
and benefits of conflict with the U.S. based on the belief that attacking our space systems 
would degrade our capabilities enough to attain operational objectives with an acceptable 
cost.  This is a case where a failure in space deterrence could lead to failures in general 
deterrence based on superior conventional advantage.  Conversely, if the cost of attacking 
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U.S. space systems is too high, not only is space deterrence maintained but general 
deterrence as well.91    
That ability to maintain a credible defense and retaliatory capability creates a 
viable deterrent.  It would be an exceptional situation where the U.S. would retaliate 
against an ASAT test by destroying an adversary’s satellite.  The potential debris from 
the ongoing engagement would threaten all future space missions to include commercial 
and manned missions.  The important topic of space debris has been an ongoing topic in 
this paper.  Additionally, going one for one with an adversary would quickly work 
against the U.S. and its numerous satellites.  At a certain point, there would be no more 
viable targets to leverage.  Conversely, an argument can be made that destroying 
terrestrial capabilities is not only a credible threat but easier with the existing military 
capabilities at the disposal of the United States.  As noted throughout this paper, it is hard 
to directly attribute a space attack.  The resultant retaliatory strike used to destroy ground 
facilities without some level of irrefutable proof would quickly earn the condemnation of 
the international community.  This also brings up the question of the relative value of 
targeting a terrestrial target in retaliation against a loss of satellite.  If the U.S. were to 
lose a single high-value, low-density ISR satellite, what would be an appropriate 
terrestrial target to destroy to ensure punitive deterrence?  Additionally, when striking 
terrestrial targets, a scenario exists where escalation quickly occurs and the retaliatory 
strikes become irrelevant.92 
It goes without saying that our adversaries will attempt to “level the playing field” 
against U.S. capabilities in any domain that is feasible.  Glenn Kent, a retired Lieutenant 
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General of the U.S. Air Force and a Senior Research Fellow of the RAND Corporation 
specialized in strategies and analysis concepts in national security, and David Thaler, a 
senior defense analysts at the RAND Corporation specializing in strategy and force 
planning, first put the concept of first-strike stability forward in 1989 to examine the 
dynamics of mutual deterrence between nuclear states.  They define the term first-strike 
stability as the two-sided calculus of each side’s cost of striking first compared with the 
cost of striking second.  Essentially that in a conflict, each side has the ability to limit 
potential damage on itself by striking an opponent’s strategic assets first.  This strategy 
leads to the added benefits of denying an opponent’s objectives in a first or second strike 
by inflicting damage on that nations valued assets.93  This concept is similar to the 
concept described by Charles Glaser, a former member of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff and 
a specialist in international relations relating to security, defensive realism, and the 
offense-defense balance, “as a measure of the countries’ incentives not to preempt in a 
crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy.”94   
Where this issue varies with space stability is that nuclear forces are not directly 
involved in maintaining stability in space, but they influence strategic stability utilizing 
capabilities such as space based missile warning.  As a result, space is seen as an 
environment where offensive capabilities will dominate.  This coupled with the inherent 
difficulty in creating satellites to operate in a contested environment, there is the 
destabilizing factor of striking space assets first to assure your military objectives.  A 
further consideration for deterrence in space is the costly nature of the infrastructure to 
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support orbital operations.95  In addition to the infrastructure, how much global 
commerce would be affected by attacks in space?  The global impact of such an attack 
would result in most nations shouldering some cost of any consortium-owned satellites as 
well as the ramifications if GPS was damaged and the banking industries were degraded 
with the lack of accurate timing.  Similar to a nuclear exchange, the resulting amount of 
orbital debris would be catastrophic if it took key orbits away from future use.  A final 
concern where there is a parallel to nuclear and space deterrence is that once the 
threshold for use is met, retaliation would likely rapidly escalate the conflict to 
unforeseen levels. 
 Bruce MacDonald, former Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms 
Control, gave a succinct representation of the end state for the U.S.  He stated that, “Our 
overall goal should be to shape the space domain to the advantage of the United States, 
and to do so in ways that are stabilizing and enhance U.S. security. The U.S. has an 
overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and function of its space assets so 
that the profound military, civilian, and commercial benefits they enable can continue to 
be available to the United States and its allies.”96  I agree with the sentiment, and the goal 
should be expanded to include all countries in creating stability in space.  Although 
advances in conventional warfare and precision guidance have led to these weapons 
being the preferred option in U.S. warfare, the threat of nuclear weapons still exists 
today.   
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The core limitation to applying conventional deterrence to the space domain is 
explained by dissecting the approach of the old, “if you shoot ours, we’ll shoot yours” 
model.97  When dealing with ground-based targets, this approach is not only reasonable 
but easily explained and understood.  However, the U.S. space inventory and reliance on 
space assets quickly shows where this model is no longer as effective.  This is solely 
based on the number of U.S. satellites that can be attacked when compared to other 
nations.  While the total number of active satellites cannot be ascertained, research shows 
the U.S. as operating more than three times the number of satellites as China.98  Potential 
enemies of the U.S., such as Russia or China, are likely going to conduct operations in 
regions where they have good knowledge of the area, a limited use of space based ISR, 
and in some cases indigenous PNT systems that the U.S. cannot access.  In that case, the 
trading shots at satellites is not practical. 
In the case that the hostile nation does not employ a space weapon that destroys a 
satellite, but relies on systems with reversible effects the threshold for retaliation is 
different.  That likely will not break the threshold that dictates a hostile response where 
space assets will be paced in jeopardy.  If the conflict were to escalate, the addition of 
strikes against high-value, low-density ISR assets could enable military success of the 
attacking country.  An example of this would be for China to target U.S. ISR assets 
before mounting a campaign in the South China Sea.  There is a school of thought that 
the U.S. should punish space aggressors with punitive terrestrial strikes.  This lends some 
credibility based on the asymmetric U.S. conventional advantage.  Nevertheless, this 
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threat may not be enough to deter aggression in space.  Some argue that despite the 
capabilities of advanced conventional weapons, they cannot generate the effects 
necessary in a short period to have a credible retaliatory strike.  Current capabilities 
would have to leverage cruise missiles launched from either submarines or aircraft to fill 
this role.  Moreover, the amount of damage generated may not be adequate for 
deterrence.99  However, if the United States were to launch cruise missiles against a 
country’s high value asset or assets, this would make for an effective and credible 
retaliatory capability in the event of an attack against a U.S. satellite.  The U.S. does have 
an associated cost with the development, deployment, and operation of each of the 
satellites in its inventory.  The value of a given space asset could be used to determine a 
strategy on what terrestrial targets to strike if needed.  This would tie into a counter-value 
strategy for deterrence with regard to space assets.     
Mr. Morgan makes an argument against attacking terrestrial targets in retaliation 
of a space asset.  His argument’s central premise is that if another nation is attacking the 
space assets of the United States, that conflict may be a foregone conclusion.  He posits a 
scenario where the targeting of those space enablers would negate the space advantage of 
the U.S. and limit the advanced conventional weapons capability in a pending conflict.  
An example of this could be seen if China were to invade Taiwan.  In this case a 
preemptive strike on U.S. ISR assets would allow for China to execute a limited 
campaign in Taiwan with a degraded U.S. military trying to project power into that 
theater.  In this case it would be more costly to attack Taiwan without striking the space 
assets first.  In this scenario, it becomes an exercise of damage limitation.  The benefit of 
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negating the space assets far outweighs the potential loss of some number of terrestrial 
assets in a retaliatory strike.  Or in the case of Taiwan invasion, the retaliatory strikes 
would be anticipated as part of the expanded conflict. 
His secondary argument leverages on the fact that for a threat to be credible, a 
nation must be willing to carry out the attack.  What level of credibility loss would the 
U.S. suffer if it failed to retaliate for the loss of capability relating to national technical 
means (NTM)?  He further argues that in destroying a satellite that there was no loss of 
life, and a terrestrial attack is not a credible response.  That argument fails to account for 
the significant amount of resources countries have invested in their space assets.  If a 
country is not punished in some form for attacking a satellite then you fundamentally 
have a deterrence failure. 
Contrasting with the opinions of Dr. Morgan are those of Mr. Peter Marquez, a 
Fellow of the George C. Marshall Institute.  He argues in his essay Space Deterrence: 
The Prêt-á-Porter Suit for the Naked Emperor that, “Recently posited theories of space 
deterrence misuse the term deterrence; they do not grasp the intent of deterrence, the full 
range of other security constructs, and, most importantly, what should be done when, not 
if, deterrence fails. Compounding this situation is the growing belief that deterrence is an 
element of defense.”100  For deterrence to work, it requires three elements.  Attribution, 
signaling, and credibility.  To apply this to effectively, the U.S. requires a demonstrated 
capability to attribute an attack on a satellite.  Next, the U.S. would need to provide clear 
signals that attacking an American satellite is not in the attacking nation’s best interest.  
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And finally, the U.S must develop, maintain, and exhibit a willingness to punish a hostile 
act to establish that the U.S. will act when one of its satellites is threatened or attacked.101 
Both China and Russia are involved in developing counterspace weapons, and 
both countries have shown a political willingness to use these weapons.  Mr. Marquez 
makes the argument that the U.S. does not have a deterrence relationship with either of 
those countries in space, but rather a compellence relationship.  The weapons under 
development by China and Russia are a threat to the United States’ ability to project 
power, and for this to change the U.S. must compel those nations to cease their activity 
on those programs.  However, as long as the U.S. is heavily reliant on space capabilities, 
China and Russia would likely not see the benefit in abandoning those weapons 
programs.  To change this relationship, the U.S. must have the ability to deny the use of 
hostile counterspace weapons by potentially denying China and Russia from meeting 
their national objectives.102   
 
Cyberspace Weapons Technology 
There is limited writing on specific cyberspace weapons employed by various 
countries.  In this section, I will define documented cyberspace weapons that were 
reportedly employed against other countries.  Specifically, I will speak to the nature of 
why these particular weapons are hard to locate and attribute to a particular user.  One of 
the most common weaponized forms of cyber-attack is the Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack.  This attack was used by the Russian Governments against Estonia in 
2007.       
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DDoS attacks occur when an attacker sends a stream of packets to the target 
computer.  This process consumes some resources, and subsequently renders those same 
resources unavailable for users of the targeted computer system.  A similar approach 
would employ malformed packets that would confuse a software application or protocol 
on the targeted computer leading it to freeze or force a reboot.  This technique is scalable 
and can be used to deny services to multiple computers in a targeted network.  This attack 
vector can ultimately lead to a point where the targeted network’s users cannot access 
internal or external services.  A DDoS attack would be executed in several phases.  First, 
the attacker would recruit a sizeable number of agent machines.  These machines could 
be from multiple locations around the world, which lends itself to the definition of the 
distributed attack.  These machines are selected based on underlying security issues with 
the machines being exploited to conduct the attack.  This phase is typically automated, 
and often leverages previously infected machines.  Once the network of exploited 
computer has been created, the attack will use these computers to generate a high volume 
of bad information packets with the sole intent of jamming the targeted network with an 
excessive volume of traffic to render it unusable.103  
The next major cyber weapon is the advanced persistent threat (APT).  The 
computer anti-virus provider McAfee describes this as, “APTs [are] sophisticated, covert 
attacks bent on surreptitiously stealing valuable data from targeted and unsuspecting 
companies [that] can inflict serious harm to your business. Their relentless, persistent 
intrusions typically target key users within organizations to gain access to trade secrets, 
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intellectual property, state and military secrets, computer source code, and any other 
valuable information available.”104 
Building on the earlier APT description, APT’s use many of the conventional 
techniques employed by organizations employing cyberspace weapons.  However, where 
they begin to differ from botnets and malware is the specific intent of the APT.  
Organizations who employ APTs are targeting strategic users with the aim of gaining 
unfettered and undetected access to sensitive information on a targeted network.  The 
very nature designed into this threat highlights the level of damage that can be 
perpetuated by this sort of weapon while it operates undetected.  A contemporary 
example of this can be observed with the employment of Stuxnet in Iran’s nuclear 
enrichment facilities.105   
Once an APT has been loaded onto the targeted system, it will evade conventional 
detection by disguising itself as legitimate network traffic.  The strategic goal of an APT 
is to establish a covert and long-duration mission of exfiltration of sensitive data to the 
organization employing the weapon.  An APT infiltration will begin by targeting the 
weakest link in any network security – the user.  That infiltration can be accomplished 
through e-mail with a hostile attachment designed to look like a real message.  This type 
of technique is commonly referred to as spear-phishing.  Other cases leverage infecting 
USB devices that are plugged into networks then loading the APT directly.  In recent 
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years, the USB standard has been compromised to contain bootable code that resides in 
the firmware that escapes most virus scanners.106   
While not an all-encompassing list, APTs typically operate in several phases of 
operation.  The first phase is the social engineering period to target an individual to 
unknowingly infect the network.  Once that person has inadvertently loaded the APT into 
the network, the malicious code will establish for all practical purposes a cyber 
beachhead.  This phase is where the hostile code will execute and establish 
communications with the organization that is executing the cyber-attack and await further 
instructions.  The next phase is the real network infiltration.  This phase builds on the 
previous success of building the beachhead on the network.  During this point, the 
attackers will begin designing custom, objective-specific code to operate on the targeted 
network.  There typically is not a one-size fits all network configuration, so some level of 
customization is required to successfully operate without being detected.  Once the 
custom application has been loaded into the system, the APT moves into the persistence 
phase.  During this phase, it will passively monitor the network, and look for 
opportunities to execute the attack based on the systems maintenance or operations 
schedule.  The final phase endures until detection.  During the final phase, the APT will 
receive remote commands to gather and exfiltrate the data to the organization conducting 
the cyber operation.  Additionally, this phase could be used not for what is essentially 
espionage but for sabotage as well.  This will be explored a bit later in this thesis.107 
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Cyber Deterrence Observations 
As noted earlier, the networks and infrastructure of the cyber domain are tangible 
things, but the cyber domain itself does not entirely exist in the physical world.  Whereas 
deterrence with regard to space weapons may be possible with an effective framework to 
ensure that space remains a sanctuary, the same cannot be said on the cyber front.  Under 
no leap of the imagination will it be possible to maintain control of cyber weapons from 
being employed operationally.  The best hope is to disincentive the use of those weapons 
against programs of national interest like power grids.  An argument can be made that an 
attack on infrastructure, even if conducted via cyber-attack, is tantamount to an act of war 
if there is loss of life.  In this case, an attack of that magnitude is likely to be a pre-cursor 
to a major regional conflict or operation.  Paul Davis, a professor of policy analysis in the 
Pardee RAND Graduate School, has researched extensively in the cyber domain.  
Specifically, he notes a study conducted by the RAND Corporation that determined that 
cyber-attack is fundamentally different from any earlier forms of conflict that has been 
recognized.108   
Aside from the obvious benefits of using cyber-operations as a means of 
intelligence collection, there are limited other uses in peacetime.  The Stuxnet incident 
highlights what is possible with cyber-attacks, but it can be argued that the employment 
of that weapon was outside the scope of intelligence operations, and delved into the arena 
of offensive operations to sabotage another nation’s national project.  This again brings 
up the obvious point of cyber-weapons as offensive weapons, and the cyber domain as an 
enabler of intelligence operations.  Cyber-attacks will not capture territory, and the 
                                                 
108 Paul Davis, “Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar,” New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 47, no. 2 (November 13, 2015): 334. 
 64 
effects will likely be temporary in the sense that equipment and infrastructure are not 
destroyed.  This is contrasted against a concerted effort against a target such as a national 
power grid, but ultimately cyber operations will enable operations in the sea, air, and land  
domains.109     
Will a nation under a cyber-attack know who committed it?110  This question is 
difficult on multiple levels.  One, even if the country has definitive proof of a cyber-
attack, most governments would be reluctant to speak to the sources and methods used to 
develop that proof.  The intelligence cost of going public may outweigh the benefit of 
doing so.  Additionally, if the intelligence was garnered from some level of cyber-
operation to gather intelligence it will be difficult to use this collected information in the 
public arena.  On the other hand, the cyber-attack could be quite complex and result in 
not enough information to allow a nation to do anything other than publicly acknowledge 
a developing situation.  Additionally, what level of retaliation is appropriate for a cyber-
attack?  From a practical standpoint, the response needs to be proportional.  Launching an 
airstrike in response to a cyber-intrusion is not an effective strategy, and that will further 
damage world opinion in future dialogue in this area.  However, if a cyber-attack were to 
damage some level of infrastructure, or have the intent of an precursor to a larger 
operation a retaliatory attack would be warranted. 
This leads to the question of holding assets at risk.  In the case of the OPM 
breach, is there a similar organization in China that keeps their personnel records on an 
unencrypted server?  I would imagine that is very doubtful, and even if the U.S. could 
conduct a retaliatory operation, the cyber infrastructure may not be in place to target 
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similar information.  That would lead to targeting of other information, potentially 
leading to a tit for tat series of cyber exchanges.  In this case, could the U.S. employ a 
capability with reversible effects to degrade communications or commerce for a limited 
period.?  Eventually, the cyber-operations could lead to unforeseen levels of escalation 
leading to additional national issues.  In the case of the OPM cyber-attack, would it be 
appropriate to try and levy sanctions against the attacking country?  That would lead to a 
discussion on what the information lost was worth, and can that be quantified in such a 
way that is acceptable on the world stage.  In this example, would the sanctions beget a 
reciprocal set of sanctions from China for previous cyber-incursions?  This example 
shows how a simple question can result in even more questions that do not advance the 
issue.   
Building on the question of holding a nation’s assets at risk over a cyber-attack 
brings up the question of can that be done repeatedly.  Along those lines, can the cyber-
attacks disarm cyber attackers?111  These questions are related in the sense that if you are 
going to retaliate over a cyber-attack a possible option would be to go after the means of 
the opposing countries cyber-operations.  If the response were covert or overt, this is 
equivalent to a counter-battery attack and could be repeated to reduce the net cyber-
capability of the attacking nation.  Whether or not these attacks were aimed at reversible 
effects or permanent effects would have to be discussed based on proportionality.  In the 
case of overt retaliation in the cyber domain, this sort of retaliation would have some 
deterrence value.  The amount of resources a nation commits to a given set of weapons is 
usually a significant amount of capital.  Potentially, this could be the cyber equivalent of 
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a counter value target.  Even under the circumstances of cyber counter-battery attack, it 
would be near impossible to disarm a cyber attacker.  The focus would need to be on 
having capabilities to degrade the capabilities of an attacking nation to limit their 
effectiveness for follow on cyber-operations.  The net capabilities could be reduced, but 
short of shutting down the Internet to the entire region, it would be difficult to carry out.  
In the case of denying a nation’s Internet, again the question would be raised on the 
proportionality of the attack.  An attack of that level would have significant harm to a 
nation’s commerce even under a limited retaliatory strike.   
The mere threat of a cyber-attack on Wall Street resulted in panic selling.  On 
April 23, 2013, an event occurred that is a real-world example of just this – an unknown 
actor hacked the Associated Press’s (AP) Twitter feed and announced that two explosions 
had hit the White House injuring President Obama.  This “tweet” resulted in a 143-point 
free fall, and caused the high-frequency trading (HFT) to start selling off billions of 
dollars in stock.112  This example shows the power of a minor cyber-attack, and you can 
imagine the enormous impact that is possible if a nation were to commit to a concerted 
cyber-attack in retaliation.  This case is used only to illustrate the potential power of a 
rumor acted on by poorly informed stock traders.  This shows that people will act 
irrationally under a set of circumstances where too much truth is placed into a source on 
the internet that is inherently unsecure.    
The framework established by the RAND Corporation asked whether third parties 
would stay out of the way, and if retaliation would send the wrong message.  There is a 
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very low probability of third parties staying out of a public cyber dispute.  The Russia-
Georgia example demonstrated this earlier.  It goes without saying that if a large scale 
cyber-attack was going on against a nation patriotic hackers would enter the fray.  In 
addition to patriotic hackers, there are several communities on the internet involved in 
hacking targets of opportunity like the groups Anonymous and LulzSec.113  Groups like 
this have been attributed to hacking news websites for their own amusement or their view 
of justice.  One of the more well-known campaigns launched by these groups was in 
support of Julian Assange and Bradley Manning for their sharing of secrets on the 
website WikiLeaks.  The view of many of these hacking groups is that information 
should be free and this was an opportunity for them to push their agenda in a public 
forum.  In this case, the hackers were engaged in support of what is essentially a criminal 
act.  Although this may not seem related to national security, it is important to note that 
many of the same individuals involved in these hacking groups will mobilize in support 
of events with national security ramifications.  After the November 2015 terrorist attacks 
in Paris, the hacking group Anonymous launched cyber-operations against the Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).  The group declared their intent to hunt down the 
militants and utilize their hacking to weaken ISIS.114  This campaign primarily focused 
on destroying the Twitter accounts utilized by ISIS for recruitment and propaganda 
purposes.  Additionally, they are attributed with determining the identity of a high-
ranking ISIS recruiter living in Europe.  This campaign forced ISIS to abandon many of 
their websites and traditional messaging means to maintain operations on the dark 
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web.115  It is not a large leap of the imagination to imagine groups like this being 
involved in any large-scale cyber-attack against another nation, but the question would 
remain for whose benefit?116  This leads to the discussion of whether or not retaliation is 
sending the wrong message.  There is a definite chance that the wrong message will be 
sent.  The message of retaliation could be lost in translation to observing nations who did 
not view the cyber-attack in the same light as the country launching a retaliatory cyber-
strike.  This could lead to further actions on the international stage that would impact the 
attacking of retaliating countries. 
Whether or not states can set thresholds for response or avoid escalation is harder 
to answer.117  Placing a value on information stolen from a cyber-attack is challenging.  
Moreover, without some level of value it is difficult to establish a threshold for a 
response.  In the case of loss of life, resulting from a cyber-attack is an area where this 
might be possible, but again you have to approach the problem of attribution of the cyber-
attack.  This highlights the need to separate the terminology associated with cyber-
attacks.  Every single cyber incident is highlighted as some sort of cyber-attack, and that 
is only partially true.  It is important to delineate between intelligence operations in the 
cyber domain versus hostile cyber-attacks.  The nature of intelligence operations will 
continue regardless of what the public perception of the cyber-attack is.  From General 
Hayden’s comments with regard to the OPM hack, an intelligence organization would 
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always strive to collect the information, and that should be separated from the retaliatory 
attack and that is an area where escalation would likely be avoided.  With regard to the 
nation attacking a power grid, you can argue that escalation has already occurred and that 
is likely the first stage of a major attack.   
This series of questions shows how viewing cyber-operations through the prism 
of previous intelligence and military operations is not going to lead to easy answers.  
Ultimately, the need for norms and policy for cyber becomes more important every day, 
and as the threat grows, it will reach a tipping point where action will be taken.  I would 
image in the near future there will be accords to normalize the behavior, and that will 
likely include some carve out for intelligence operations. 
Chapter three focused on the various technologies either under developed, or 
utilized in operations today.  These technologies represent only what is currently 
imagined, and is by no means an all-encompassing explanation of the space and 
cyberspace threat in existence.  The speed observed in technological development only 
illustrates how fast the technology and the threat is developing, and that continued 
evaluation is required to ensure that future missions are designed to operate in contested 
environments.  In the next chapter, I will examine various cases observed during the past 
few years where nations employed these weapons to demonstrate that they can hold 
satellites at risk or employ cyber technology to further national aims.   
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CHAPTER FOUR – CASE STUDIES 
 
Chapter four examines the employment of the various space and cyber weapons 
technologies to further the development of these capabilities or to augment ongoing 
operations of those nations.  These examples illustrate not only the theoretical use of the 
weapons, but also the real world ramifications of their employment.   
 
2007 China ASAT Test 
Easily the most provocative space weapons test in recent history was conducted 
by China on January 11, 2007 against their defunct FENGYUN 1C polar-orbiting (sun-
synchronous) weather satellite.  This anti-satellite weapon was launched from a road 
mobile Dong Feng-21 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) transporter erector 
launcher (TEL) shown in Figure 5.118  The intercept was conducted between 852 and 864 
kilometers which is consistent with the altitudes of most reconnaissance satellites.  This 
test was not announced prior to execution, but was later publicly acknowledged by the 
Chinese government after the large amounts of international outcry by the large amounts 
of debris generated by the test.  The initial debris field from the ASAT engagement can 
be observed in the lower right portion of Figure 6. 119  This illustrates the devastating 
effect of a kinetic weapon impacting a satellite at speeds greater than seven kilometers 
per second.  The resultant debris field continues to be a threat to low earth objects today.   
                                                 
118 T.S. Kelso, “AGI USER Exchange 2007: Chinese ASAT Test Analysis,” Analytical Graphics, Inc. 
(AGI), accessed January 5, 2016, https://www.agi.com/downloads/events/2007-agi-user-
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119 Global Security, “SC-19 ASAT Test,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified January 2007, accessed 
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Figure 5. Dong Feng-21 Road-Mobile IRBM.120 
 
Figure 6. FENGYUN-1C Debris Track Post Engagement.121 
 
                                                 
120 Kelso, “AGI USER Exchange 2007: Chinese ASAT Test Analysis.” 
121 Kelso, “CelesTrak: Chinese ASAT Test.” 
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Jonathan McDowell, a Harvard astronomer who tracks rocket launches and space 
activity noted that, “This is the first real escalation in the weaponization of space that 
we’ve seen in 20 years.  It ends a long period of restraint.”122  Prior to this test, both the 
United States and Soviet Union had been involved in ASAT development and testing.  
The amount of debris generated from the Chinese test varies from the various reports.  
However, it is estimated that there are greater than 3,000 objects generated and those 
objects will remain on-orbit for a period ranging from two to over ninety years before 
that debris encounters the Earth’s atmosphere.123  This engagement shows the power of 
such weapons in space, and the true impact to deterrence is still being determined.  I 
would argue that China’s space weapons development program designers understands the 
deterrence nature of these weapons when applied to the U.S. and the vast array of 
military technology that relies on space based information to ensure conventional 
weapons dominance.  The threshold for use of ASAT weapons is likely lower than that of 
nuclear weapons, and the threat of use against the U.S. would likely lead to some level of 
discussion or coercion to meet China’s goals. 
This is consistent with the writings of Professor Bao Shixiu of the PLA Academy 
of Military Sciences mentioned in chapter two.  He is quoted as saying, “[There] will be a 
taboo on the use of space weapons, [and] the threshold of their use will be lower than that 
of nuclear weapons because of their conventional characteristics.  Space debris may 
threaten the space assets of other ‘third party’ countries, but the level of destruction, 
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especially in terms of human life, could be far less than nuclear weapons or potentially 
even conventional weapons.  Therefore, the threshold of force capability required to 
launch an effective deterrent will inevitably be higher than for that of nuclear weapons. 
This unique nature of space weapons will affect the determination of the quantity and 
technical level of a ‘deterrent capability’ in space.”124 
  This shows the dichotomy of this sort of weapon.  For countries heavily reliant 
on space, the mere presence of these weapons will lead to a large change in strategic 
planning.  The perspective of Professor Shixiu is merely one facet of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), but he does represent the thinking of the PLA’s Academy of 
Military Sciences.  This assertion speaks only to the employment of KKVs as a 
conventional weapon, but does not describe the likely calamitous economic effects of a 
limited of prolonged conflict in space.  As mentioned in chapter one, the threat of space 
debris in space conflict has the chance of causing a cascading series of collisions leading 
to increased space debris denying the use of low-earth orbit for years to come.      
 
Stuxnet Employment In Iran 
The Stuxnet virus was the first cyber weapon seemingly employed by a nation 
against another with the intent of affecting its core interests.125  Stuxnet, an unconfirmed 
joint U.S./Israeli venture, was employed against Iran's Natanz nuclear facility that 
damaged nearly a fifth of the country's nuclear enrichment centrifuges.  The deployment 
of this virus mirrored typical warfare where initial reconnaissance is conducted prior to 
                                                 
124 Bao Shixiu, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space*,” China Security Journal, no. Winter 2007 (January 1, 
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125 Ralph Langner, “Cyber Weapons: Stuxnet’s Secret Twin,” The Brookings Institution, accessed April 1, 
2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/19-stuxnet-secret-twin-langner. 
 74 
an attack.  Stuxnet developed a blueprint of the nuclear facility that allowed the tailoring 
of the attack vector.  Once an operational understanding had been developed of Natanz, 
the virus was designed to command the centrifuges to operate in a way to damage the 
controllers while providing an expected operational status to the technicians monitoring 
the equipment.126 
The cyber-attack itself utilized two methods.  The first method utilized the 
overpressure of the gas control system, and the second capability to change the rotor 
speeds of the centrifuge to damage the centrifuges.  This control system and the 
associated instrumentation do not serve any operational process, but detects any 
anomalies for the overall safety and protection of the system and the operating 
environment.  The centrifuges used by Iran are controlled by the amount and pressure of 
gas used to control the spin during the enrichment process.  The gas centrifuges used by 
Iran are configured into groups to maximize enrichment efficiency.  These groups share 
the same input gas piping, product, and output gas piping and this process is designed to 
cascade from one centrifuge to the next.  The input pressure controls the overall 
efficiency of centrifuges, and the high sensitivity of the device is dramatically impacted 
by moderate variations of pressure.  An increase of inlet pressure will cause more 
uranium hexafluoride entering the centrifuge resulting in higher mechanical stress on the 
rotor.  Rotor wall pressure is impacted by the velocity and operating pressure that can 
result in solidification of the gas driving the centrifuges resulting in uranium enrichment 
being halted and possibly destroying the equipment.  This meets the intent of delaying 
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enrichment, but the overt nature of this attack will ensure detection of a malicious 
intent.127 
While the intent of an overpressure attack is to delay enrichment without 
hardware destruction, the possibility of lethal use led to the development of an alternate 
method.  This new approach was simpler at the cost of being more easily detectable. 
Where the overpressure attacked the gas system, this new approach attacks the most 
sensitive component of the centrifuge the rotor.  Each of the centrifuges has a motor 
capable of spinning at 100,000 revolutions per minute (rpm) with a constant torque 
during acceleration and deceleration.  The Iranian centrifuges typically operated around 
63,000 rpm, but the initial attack increased the speed by one third.  It is unlikely that this 
modest speed increase had any impact to the rotors.  An additional attack profile occurred 
by bringing all the centrifuges in the cascade to 120 rpm, and the spun them back up.  An 
attack like this has a larger chance of damage since it is similar to a hard-braking 
maneuver.  The control system likely would prevent an instant spin down, but this attack 
vector can allow the centrifuges to travel through zones were the harmonic dissonance 
could cause hardware damage.  Both of these attacks show the capability to destroy 
equipment.  Further modification of the cyber weapon could override the control system 
causing runaway failure.  This shows the creator of the cyber weapon intended to delay 
the program, but not to overtly destroy or damage the hardware used by the Iranians.  
This strategy shows the varying shades of grey of weapon system employment to meet 
limited campaign objectives.128   
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The Stuxnet campaign highlighted the capabilities and impacts of a cyber-attack 
launched against a nation's interests.  This is one of the only documented cyber-attacks to 
date, and shows an unprovoked attack based on the intent to pursue a nuclear weapons 
program.  The attack itself was not reported in the media to result in any loss of life or 
any significant damage to national infrastructure, but did have a material impact on a 
national goal of enriching uranium.  A further consideration on cyber-attacks is if a much 
more technologically developed country employs cyber weapons against a smaller 
country, under what circumstances would the smaller country attack.  Although Iran’s 
nuclear program suffered from a cyber-attack, there is no research to support an increase 
in terrorist operations against either the U.S. or Israel.  Iran has a well-documented 
history of funding third-party terrorist organizations to attack both the U.S. and Israel.  
Moreover, based on their limited capabilities to attack the U.S., it is consistent that proxy 
violence sponsored by Iran would be the continued course of action.  The result of cyber-
attacks may be proxy violence, but war is not a foregone conclusion.  
 
Russia’s Cyber Attack Of Georgia 
Georgia, a former republic of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), has 
experienced quite a bit of turmoil since the dissolution of the USSR.  This turmoil is a 
result of history with the government changes frequently between the Russian czars, a 
short independence after the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Soviet Union.  Georgia’s 
post-Soviet borders included the province of South Ossetia, a province containing people 
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who were ethnically and linguistically different from Georgia.129  North Ossetia 
happened to be within the borders of the Russian Federation, although its inhabitants are 
ethnically the same as the South Ossetians located in Georgia.  There remained a state of 
protracted violence between the Russian backed province of South Ossetia seeking 
independence from Georgia.  Several attempts had been made by the Russian-backed 
government to gain autonomy, but they were suppressed by the Georgian government.  
This situation continued to escalate until after the election of Georgian president Mikheil 
Saakashvili in 2003.  During this period of escalation, President Saakashvili pursued an 
agenda that included building up military capabilities to quell the uprising in both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as applying to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).130   
In what would become a similar pattern that would be observed in Russian 
operations to annex Crimea in 2014, the opposition to Saakashvili’s action continued to 
increase tensions between the two states and would encourage anti-Georgian resistance in 
South Ossetia.  On August 7, 2008, Georgia moved their military forces into the region in 
response for an alleged ceasefire violation.  This ultimately led to a Russian military 
incursion into South Ossetia where they launched air strikes into limited targets in 
Georgia.131  Just prior to Russia’s military action, an alleged offensive cyber-attack 
against Georgian digital infrastructure was launched to confuse a coordinated military 
response.  This attack undermined the effectiveness of the Georgian government in 
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dealing with the Russian attack.  Essentially, this led to a one-sided information 
dominance that limited the Georgian’s from managing the information of the attacks and 
leading to further confusion for the citizens of Georgia.  Further cyber operations were 
initiated by hackers against the BBC and CNN to shape the opinions and portrayal of the 
Russian invasion.  Specifically, these cyber-attacks were carried out to minimize the 
possibility of the Russians being observed as the aggressor in this operation.  
Additionally, there was a conscious effort to demoralize the Georgian people by defacing 
websites and comparing President Saakashvili to Adolf Hitler.132   
The initial cyber-attacks targeted government and media services to prevent 
communication about the Russian invasion into Georgia.  As the Russians moved further 
into South Ossetia, the cyber-attacks were expanded to include further government sites 
as well as those of financial institutions, business, educational institutions, and to known 
Georgian hacking forums to limit any counter cyber operations.133  This cyber-attack was 
not limited to Georgian infrastructure.  Cyber-attacks were launched into servers located 
in both Turkey and Ukraine that provided communication services into Georgia to further 
disrupt their network infrastructures.134  The cyber weapons employed by the Russians 
were not terribly sophisticated and they primarily used distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks and/or web-defacement.  The techniques used by the Russian hackers 
were not intended to cause physical damage to the infrastructure even though the targeted 
services were vulnerable to such an attack.135  While the cyber-attacks continued for 
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weeks after the invasion, the largest and most effective attacks took place during the 
initial five-day window of Russian military action from August 8 to August 12, 2008.  
After this period, all parties signed a ceasefire.  However, attribution of the cyber-attacks 
was never established to a particular entity.  Evidence supported that a wide variety of 
hacking elements within Russia were likely involved to include the Russian military, 
powered business networks, organized crime, intelligence agencies, and patriotic Russian 
hackers.136   
Unfortunately, the lack of preparation and investment in network defense by the 
Georgian government led to a poor response to cyber-attacks and was inadequate to 
forestall the impacts.  Since just a few years prior Estonia had been on the receiving end 
of a similar attack, the Estonian government was able to provide technical assistance to 
mitigate the damage done as well as address other vulnerabilities seen by Georgia.  
Georgia’s initial response to block Russian IP addresses worked only for a short amount 
of time before the hackers rerouted their attacks from new IP addresses.  Showing the 
benefits of corporate engagement, web services companies such as Google and Tulip 
allowed critical Georgian government functions to be re-hosted to servers located in the 
U.S. for further mitigation.  While this did alleviate some of the direct attacks on 
Georgian systems, it led to a significant volume of the Russian attack being directed 
against those U.S.-based servers.  This led to academic debates about private companies’ 
roles in future cyber conflicts.  All the while, Georgian hackers were able to rally in 
support of their nation and attempt to implement DDoS counter-attacks against Russian 
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news media, but these efforts were too disorganized and small in scale compared to the 
Russian-based attacks.137       
 
Chinese Hack Of OPM 
In June 2015, the U.S. government publicly acknowledged that that U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) had been penetrated by cyber-attack.  This 
acknowledgement purportedly would put the U.S. in an awkward position for a few 
reasons.  First, just a few months prior to this cyber-attack, U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter had announced that the United States would retaliate against major cyber-
attacks.  This retaliation would use either cyber tools or other means at the government’s 
disposal.  The OPM cyber-attack is the first large scale test of this new strategy, and to 
what level the government will respond without clear evidence of who is behind this 
attack.  More importantly, if these attacks are attributed to the government of China, a 
fellow nuclear state, what sort of retaliation would be acceptable and proportional?  
Additionally, will this action lead to deterrence against future attacks?138   
The cyber-attacks against OPM resulted in the theft of personal information of 
more than twenty million Americans.  By itself, that is unfortunate, but when coupled 
with the knowledge that the stolen information was mostly from current and former 
employees of the U.S. Federal government who in some cases serve in sensitive roles, 
sheds a different light on the hack.  The stolen data are surmised as being from mostly 
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employees who served a non-sensitive, public trust or national security positon since 
2000 as a government employee or Federal contractor.  In the case of 1.1 million records, 
the stolen data included fingerprints of the employees.  After the preliminary 
investigation, the U.S. Government believes the government of China is behind this 
instance of cyber-espionage.  The deterrence question associated with this intrusion deals 
with the nature of the penetration and how important is the information?139  From a basic 
level, the information garnered from this attack is a counter intelligence windfall of epic 
proportions.  The Chinese Government could derive from this information agents 
operating in country as well as use this information to target individuals with access to 
sensitive material.  At a basic level, this is not an attack with the sole intent of crippling 
U.S. cyber infrastructure, but it does have potential longer-term effects for national 
security.   
I believe this will challenge the U.S. cyber policy, and likely requires some sort of 
retaliation.  However, it is difficult to measure what level of retaliation is appropriate for 
this attack.  Without clear ramifications for this level of attack, potential cyber deterrence 
is diminished going forward.  There is discussion on the OPM hack differing from the 
traditional cyber-attack.  This is based on the fact that the intent was not to steal 
commercial or military data, nor to inflict any physical damage.  This is further 
compounded by the fact the U.S. makes a clear distinction between intelligence 
operations for national security and cyber-espionage for commercial gain.  The U.S. has 
acknowledged its role in intelligence gathering in the cyberspace domain, which is a 
legitimate function of a nation.  However, the U.S. argues that the cyber-espionage with 
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the intent of stealing commercial information is not.  One could argue the OPM hack falls 
under legitimate intelligence collection, and former CIA/NSA director Michael Hayden is 
quoted as saying, “If I, as director of the CIA or NSA, would have had the opportunity to 
grab the equivalent in the Chinese system, I would not have though twice, I would not 
have asked permission.”140   
As noted earlier, it is very difficult to attribute a cyber-attack to a particular nation 
or actor.  This is especially true with this OPM hack, and the availability of public 
information precludes that level of analysis in this case.  If the Chinese Government was 
involved in acquiring personal data on U.S. Government employees or contractors, this 
enables them to plan further operations with those data.  This could allow China to build 
comprehensive cyber-personas to spoof existing systems further penetrating U.S. cyber 
networks.  On the other hand, the cyber-attack on OPM could be retaliation for earlier 
U.S. cyber-operations.  This illustrates the fundamental issue in play, without attribution 
– deterrence is not possible.  Without compelling evidence of who the attacker is, it is not 
possible to bring the evidence into the open without compromising potential U.S. 
operations.  It comes down to a trade between protecting capabilities while maintaining 
deterrence to protect not only the information systems but personal information.  
Moreover, if the U.S. were to openly retaliate against China for a cyber-intrusion without 
definitive proof, they risk the condemnation of the international community.141 
These events show that employment of these weapons systems is something that 
can be observed when the attacking country is using them overtly.  However, there has 
not been any research presented to show the timeline of the OPM hack.  At the time this 
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thesis was written, there were only limited sources alleging the OPM hack occurring as 
early as November 2013.142  The OPM event likely utilized an APT over the course of 
some time to exploit the security present on those servers.  This shows what is possible 
with cyber-attacks when an adversary is patient enough to covertly engage another nation 
with the intent of gathering large amounts of information.  Each of these cases highlights 
the difficulties of attributing the source of an attack to the point of origin.  In addition, 
without that knowledge, it will be near impossible to justify retaliatory operations for 
reasons that will be explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has covered numerous topics relevant to space and cyber deterrence.  
To cover this topic effectively, it was necessary to explore what makes space and 
cyberspace unique when compared with the more traditional domains, as well as cover 
the technology being employed in current and future weapon systems.  This paper also 
focused on several real-world examples of systems employment in recent history.  These 
scenarios ranged from the 2007 Chinese ASAT test to various levels of cyber-attacks in 
Iran, Georgia, and the United States.  Each of these chapters answered questions and led 
to the various conclusions that will be outlined in this chapter.   
As more nations and organizations acquire either space or cyber capabilities, it 
becomes more difficult to protect vital infrastructure from attack.  It is clear that with the 
immense resources being invested into space weapons by countries like China to offset 
the United States’ military advantage that stability in space is not a foregone conclusion.  
The attractiveness of attacking vulnerable satellites does show some level of capacity for 
norms in space with regard to space weapons, but that is only if the U.S. works to build a 
credible deterrent to the employment of space weapons.  It becomes essential to 
determine an effective cost to benefit analysis where the U.S. could punish enemies for 
attacks in space.   
Earlier in the paper, Dr. Morgan asked, “Can future enemies be deterred from 
attacking U.S. space systems?  To what degree is deterrence reliable, and under what 
circumstances might it fail?”143  Furthermore, space systems are reliant on robust cyber 
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infrastructure and the same question applies equally to the cyber domain.  Although the 
question cannot be answered equivocally, the U.S. can work toward satisfying the major 
components required to establish a successful strategy for deterrence.  That strategy will 
require investment in attribution, signaling, and establishing credibility through 
demonstrated actions.   
The very nature of space and cyberspace complicate attribution.  The U.S. will 
require a robust capability that can observe not only space but also cyberspace.  That is a 
nearly insurmountable challenge for any government to face.  However, without the 
ability to attribute an attack, the deterrence is not possible.  The U.S. has invested heavily 
into space situational awareness since the Cold War, and that continues today with 
upgrades to existing space monitoring capabilities.  This should continue until the U.S. 
can maintain a seemingly complete chain of custody for any new object launched into 
space.  The need to detect a space launch, track the newly launched object into orbit, and 
characterize whether or not the object is a threat is only the beginning.  There will 
continue to be a need for ongoing monitoring of the various orbit regime to ensure that 
new objects and threats do not appear and threaten existing missions.  Air Force Space 
Command has begun down that path with the launch of the Geosynchronous (GEO) 
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Program (GSSAP).  This capability will maneuver 
near an object of interest, and enable that characterization for anomaly resolution and 
enhanced surveillance, to aid in maintaining flight safety.144  This program should be 
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seen as an initial investment, and continue to be developed further to enable attribution in 
space. 
Additionally, the U.S. should focus on effective signaling with regard to space 
and cyberspace mission.  This begins with the National Space Policy of the United States 
of America that states, “The United States will employ a variety of measures to help 
assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right 
of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and 
contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to 
attack them.”145   This statement shows that U.S. as making a public declaration on the 
intent to deter hostile actors from attacking satellites of the United States.  However, 
statements alone will not ensure deterrence.  The U.S. needs to be a credible actor in this 
arena.  If the U.S. government fails to act in accordance with this guidance if an 
American or allied satellite is attacked, that undermines the overall credibility towards 
deterrence.  The U.S. cannot be trapped establishing redlines or rigid guidelines in this 
area.  It is important to leave some level of ambiguity to prevent hostile nations from 
taking action just outside of those guidelines.  Mr. Marquez noted that if the U.S. policy 
was that, “foreign satellites should not be closer than 1 kilometer of our national technical 
means, our response options would be limited and it would invite an adversary to stand 
1.1 kilometers away from our NTM.”146   This would allow an adversary to follow the 
spirit of the U.S. guidance but not the intent. 
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These three items will never guarantee deterrence and there is no certainty on the 
degree of reliability for any deterrence strategy.  However, failure to meet these three 
criteria undermines any chance of success.  This is further complicated by the fact that 
the U.S. may not understand what motivates an adversary and how to construct a strategy 
that will lead to credible deterrence.  This leads to the final point of what to do in the case 
of deterrence failure.   
Although not one of the three components of a deterrence strategy, the U.S. 
should develop a plan in the event that a U.S. satellite is attacked.  The U.S. should go on 
record with limited details on what the U.S. response would be in the event of an attack.  
There should be no question in another governments mind that the U.S. will act in the 
event of attack.  Deterrence is not a defensive strategy, and every effort should be made 
to establish a robust space architecture to operate in a contested space environment.  The 
U.S. already has a declaratory policy on assured access to space.147   Further investment 
in this area is one way to disincentive an adversary from attacking U.S. satellites.  If the 
U.S. can replace satellites that have been attacked quickly that limits the utility of 
attacking the space asset.  Satellites are already hardened to exist in the space 
environment, but further requirements should be levied during the design phase to ensure 
robust satellites are developed for operational use.  Continued disaggregation of space 
systems should be pursued to complicate an adversary’s targeting, and lead to a defense 
in depth of space systems.  Although deterrence is never guaranteed – chance favors the 
prepared. 
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